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ABSTRACT
Driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA) is a regularly 
occurring phenomenon on the nation’s streets and highways. Despite 
recent threats of severe formal sanctions, a review of the literature 
discloses the presence of upswings in DUIA offenses (see, for example, 
Ross, 1973, 1984a, and 1984b). The present study contends that 
legislative sanctions, regardless of severity, cannot suffic ien tly  curb the 
drunken driver unless they are met with the concern of an equally 
sanctitive public (Formby and Smykla, 1984). Given the underlying 
theme, the explicit goal of research presented here is to report the 
extent and power of peer sanction surrounding potential drinking and 
driving situations. This goal consists of the following components: (1) 
to discern whether individuals are at all inclined to attempt 
intervention in situations of potential drunken driving, and i f  so, to 
ascertain the types of intervention techniques a ttempted as well as 
intervention settings; (2) to determine which in tervention techniques 
tend to produce the best (i.e. most preventive) results; and (3) to 
establish some demographic and  social psychological characteristics of 
those who do and do not intervene. Data used in discussing these 
issues are gathered from a questionnaire administered to elements of 
a population known for frequent drinking practices—college students.
INTRODUCTION
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It is estimated that at least half of all t ra f f ic  fatalities in the 
United States are directly a ttributable to alcohol and that some "10 
percent of all drivers are legally impaired" (as a result of alcohol 
consumption) during the weekend hours of 8:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M.-the 
time frame in which nearly "[eighty] percent of all fa ta l alcohol-related 
crashes occur" (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1985:1-3). Drunken 
drivers are said to be responsible for some 750,000 physical injuries and 
26,000 deaths per year (Smith, 1981:130). In fact, motor-vehicle 
accidents are "the leading cause of mortality among young adults under 
35, claiming more lives than all other causes of deaths combined, and 
about four times the number of lives lost from  the next leading cause of 
death," i.e. homicide(National Bulletin, 1983:2). Moreover, it  has been 
concluded that "every 23 minutes, someone in this country is killed in an 
accident involving a drunk driver" (Shaw,1981:116). Drunken drivers also 
account for an annual national property damage loss of twenty-one 
billion dollars (U.S. Department of Justice, 1985:1).
These statistics, formidable though they may appear, emphasize the 
fact that drunken  driving is a serious issue. It should be made clear 
from the start, however, that the behavior and subsequent consequences 
of driving a f te r  drinking is not in itself the heart of the 
drinking-driving problem in the sociological sense. Rather, drunken 
driving has become a problem of society only insofar as it has been 
socially recognized as one. It is in respones to such recognition, 
moreover, that the types of statistical in form ation  presented above have 
been diseminated in public consciousness.
A good example of how drunken driv ing has become identified as a 
social problem is seen through the efforts  of organizations like Mothers 
Against D runk Driving (MADD), Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), and 
Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD). These organizations have 
convened around the drunken driving issue by demanding stronger 
legislative attention and subsequent action. They have in effect promoted 
the defin ition  of drunken driving as a social problem, for "social 
problems are fundam entally  products of a process of collective definition 
[and] do not exist independently [or ’dingfen] an sich[en]’ (Gusfield, 
1984:3)] as sets of objective social arrangements with intrinsic makeup" 
(Blumer, 1971:301).
It should be of little surprise to note that  the subject of this 
s tu d y -d ru n k en  driv ing—has been a subject of study for many other 
scholars of social behavior. Yet to say that  this work examines 
drunken driving is not to say that it follows the lead of all or even 
most of the prior works in the area. The purpose of this is to add a 
new dimension to the study of the subject, a dimension emphasizing the 
effectiveness of informal intervention as a means toward dealing with 
the problem.
Until quite recently few observers have acknowledged the 
potentially powerful role informal intervention can play in ’curbing’ the 
drunken driver. Exceptions are found in the works of Hernandez and 
Rabow (1987); Rabow, Hernandez, and Watts (1986); Reed (1981); and an 
instructive allusion in Formby and Smykla (1984). These shall be 
discussed in the following chapter.
Prior to this decade, however, and especially since the 1930s, most
drunken-driving research emphasized the debilitating effect alcohol has 
on the ability to drive. The common subjects of observation in the 
1950s, ’60s, and ’70s included examining the presence of alcohol in the 
blood of automobile-accident victims, analyzing demographic 
characteristics of drunken drivers, and studying accident patterns of 
treated alcoholics (Gusfield, 1981:61-63).
In the 1980s, research on drunken  driving has had many themes. 
First, some studies have examined characteristics of the offender (Voas 
and Williams (1986), Weisner (1986), Ball and Lilly (1986), Snow et al.
(1985), Argeriou et al. (1985), McCord (1984), Holden (1983), and 
Donovan et al. (1983)). Second, others, including McCormack (1985) and 
Rocha and Pieterse (1984) have emphasized cross-cultural and /o r  gender 
d ifferences in drunken-driving offenders. A th ird  group, namely Ross et 
al. (1986), Hughes and Dodder (1985), Hilton (1984), Ross (1984a and 
1984b), Shapiro and Votey (1984), Votey (1984), and N eff  and Landrum
(1983) has researched the impact of formal legislative deterrence, with 
or without cross cultural considerations. Finally, some have analyzed 
public perceptions of the drunken driving problem; examples are Larson
(1986), Bankston et al. (1986), Reinarm an (1985), Formby and Smykla
(1984), and Gusfield (1981).
The above list of citings is indicative of the numerous ways in 
which drunken driving has been and continues to be analyzed. Drunken 
driv ing has been defined not only as a social problem, but as a problem 
for scholarly research as well.
This thesis addresses drunken driving (or drinking-driving as I will 
at times refer to it) from an informal-deterrence perspective. Specific
questions (i.e. problem definitions) to be addressed include: (1) Are 
individuals inclined to intervene in potential drinking-driving situations?; 
(2) if  individuals do intervene, where does this intervention occur, what 
types of intervention techniques are employed, and who are the persons 
receiving intervention (i.e. the intervenees)?; (3) which techniques and 
settings of intervention seem to produce the most deterrent results?; and 
(4) does there appear to be certain social-psychological and /or  
demographic characteristics associated with those who do intervene 
compared to those who do not?.
This text is divided into four sections. Chapter One serves to 
justify  the relevance of informal intervention as a means toward 
understanding drinking-driving. It is argued and substantiated that  the 
most common means of drinking-driving control to da te—i.e. formal, 
legislative deterrence—fails in preventing many motorists from driving 
a f te r  drinking. Informal intervention is introduced as a potential 
deterrent to drinking-driving. Chapter Two describes the methodological 
considerations of and techniques employed in making the observations 
upon whichthis study is based. Emphasized here are key concepts and 
subsequent operationalizations underlying the study, limits to 
nonprobability convenience sampling procedures, and the nature of 
self-administered questionnaires as techniques of survey research. 
Observations are analyzed, interpreted, and discussed in Chapter Three, 
and Chapter Four contains a discussion of practical suggestions for 
fu ture  research in the area of drinking-driving and informal intervention.
Chapter One
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THE LEGITIMACY OF INFORMAL INTERVENTION 
AS A MEANS TOWARD CONTROLLING 
DRINKING-DRIVING
The automobile drove through the opening of the twentieth 
century  carrying a new force for violence and danger. It 
pushed aside the leisurely boat and ran a victorious race 
against the still competing railroad. In its pervasive and 
p rofound impact on American life, the auto became the source 
of new public problems and new issues in the regulation of 
behavior (Gusfield, 1981:113).
This passage conveys the paradoxically beneficial yet 
simultaneously costly considerations the automobile makes in reference 
to the lives of those sharing common membership in advanced, mobile 
societies. It is obvious that the automobile surpasses in speed and 
convenience other pre-existing modes of private transportation, making 
it an effective vehicle for every-day use. Nevertheless, it is that same 
speed and convenience which makes the automobile a potential 
"weapon"—a person’s private vehicle of unprecedented power and force. 
This of course is indicative of the above passage which alludes to the 
many problems facing advanced society due to the advent of automotive 
travel. Drinking-driving is one such problem.
Drunken driving accounts for the loss of approximately one-half of 
all human lives lost to fata l automobile accidents per year (i.e. 
approximately 52,000 in 1987); d rinking  and driv ing is the cause of 
nearly twenty-nine times as many physical in juries—many of which are 
permanantly d eb il i ta t ing - than  deaths, and drinking-driv ing accidents 
cost tax and motor-vehicle insurance payers approximately twenty-one
billion dollars annually. It appears striking tha t  while the distinct 
behaviors of consuming alcoholic beverages, on the one hand, and 
operating a motorized vehicle, on the other, are so generally and widely 
accepted throughout most subcultural sectors of society today, the 
combination of these behaviors can create a composite so volatile as to 
threaten human life, limb, and livelihood. To be sure, the various 
effects of alcohol on the human body and psyche, including "the slightly 
impaired judgment, the false sense of security, the slower reaction time, 
the narrowed peripheral vision, the lessening of depth perception, the 
loss of visual acuity, the reduction of cue-taking, the infla ted  ego and 
the undue expansion of aggression all, at some time, take their toll on 
the highways" (Carrol, 1970:39).
Drinking-Driving: A Public Problem
In accordance with the viewpoints of many, driving a f te r  drinking 
has become a major social malady, a public concern by the defin ition  of 
C. Wright Mills who sharply d ifferen tia tes  between "personal troubles" 
and "public issues" (1959) or Joseph R. Gusfield who contrasts "social 
problems" with "public problems" (1981). Such recognition is largely a 
phenomenon of the 1980s. This is not to imply tha t  the concern over 
drinking-driving is new; it actually dates back to the earlier part of this 
century. Neither is the concern in perfect correlation with the 
emergence of automotive travel. "Legislative records," for example,
"show that the combination of [drinking and ’d riv ing’] prompted early 
laws regarding the manner in which a man drove his horse after
7overindulging a t the local public house" (Volpe, 1984:111). Quite 
recently, however, (especially since the late 1970s and. early 1980s) the 
drinking-driv ing issue has been publicly displayed at an increasingly 
rapid pace, and larger numbers of people than ever before have come to 
the realization that  driv ing after  drinking is a serious issue.
To state that drinking-driving is a public problem is to say that it 
is defined and collectively recognized w ith in  the public arena as a 
phenomenon with negative social impact (Gusfield, 1981:5). "Social 
problems are not the result of an intrinsic m alfunctioning of a society 
but are the result of a process of defin ition  in which a given condition 
[(e.g. drinking-driving)] is picked out and iden tif ied  as a social problem" 
(Blumer, 1971:301). The perspective embodied in this quote, the 
subjective orientation, d iffe rs  from its polar perspective, an objective 
orientation, in that where the latter depicts social problems being 
defined as such due to "an objective recognition of. . .harmful effects," 
the form er puts forth  the notion that "the process of collective 
definition [is] the crucial determinant of a social problem" (Bankston et 
al., 1986:108).
Beginning early in this decade, grass-root organizations developed 
for the purpose of institutionalizing a collective defin ition  of 
drinking-driv ing as a social problem. To be sure, public concern about 
driving a f te r  drinking already existed prior to the emergence of these 
organizations. Two Gallup Reports document reason for this concern by 
finding that "alcohol related problems [are] on the rise" (1977a:22) and 
that "four in 10 drive a f te r  boozing" (1977b:25). But even as of the late 
1970s, this concern was not centralized nor did it  have a recognized
forum  through which open communication could proceed. Adopting 
acronymic names like Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID), Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD), and Students Against D runk Driving (SADD), the 
organizations developed with the central goal of collectively perpetuating 
the public-problem status of drinking-driving. Not only did RID, MADD, 
and SADD view the objective consequences of drunken  driv ing with 
aversion, they also sought to mobilize an e ffo rt  to achieve meliorative 
goals by form ulating plans of action and attempting to implement them 
in social policies. Specifically, the organizations acted (1) to inform the 
public about the severity and life-threatening consequences of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), (2) to promote the passage of 
legislation mandating swift, sure, and severe penalties for DUIA 
offenders, and (3) to monitor criminal justice and law enforcement 
agencies in order to be certain that these institutions were dealing 
effectively with the problem (Charleville, 1982). What concrete changes 
did these organizations demand? To answer this, we must look into the 
past.
The Historical-Legal Context 
of the Drinking-Driving 
Concern
Prior to the emergence of organizations like RID, MADD, and 
SADD—or the invention of the automobile for that 
m atte r-d r ink ing -d riv ing  was regarded as an illegal act. As mentioned 
earlier, driving a f te r  drinking  was formally "discouraged" even if a 
person were on horseback. Yet in 1934, some th irty-two years a f te r
Ford Motor Company was founded, the phrase "under the influence of
alcohol" (UIA) had yet to be empirically defined by the legal system.
In fact, the phrase did not gain legal defin ition  until 1935 when the
Arizona Supreme Court ruled:
The expression. . .covers not only all the well-known and 
easily recognized conditions and degrees of intoxification, but 
any abnormal mental or physical condition which is the result 
of indulging in any degree of intoxicating liquors. . . .If the 
ability  of the driver of an automobile has been lessened in the 
slightest degree by the use of intoxicating liquors, then the 
driver is deemed to be under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor (see Carrol, 1970:39).
Such a definition, albeit legal, still had an extreme limitation in 
that apprehension of drinking drivers was dependent solely upon the 
subjective discretion of law enforcement authorities. The defin ition  
failed to grant "either the motorist or enforcement agencies a 
predictable standard of behavior which violates the law" (Grant and 
Ritson, 1983:159). "Intoxification could only be determined by simple 
observation and performance—the odor of alcohol, walking a straight 
line, touching the nose—all subjective procedures, neither scientifically 
accurate nor legally viable" (Hoffman, 1973:80). Hence, although UIA 
was given legal-definition status in 1935, enforceability  was questionable 
at best. This changed during the following year.
In 1936, the criticism that in toxification could be determined only 
through subjective detection lost its validity. "Technological innovation 
of blood-alcohol measurement made possible a new kind of law. . .in 
which the presence of a given level of alcohol in the blood became a 
crime per se" (Grant and Ritson, 1983:160). However, most states at 
that time used blood-alcohol measurement as a presumptive indicator of
UIA rather than an effective one. That is, even though specific 
blood-alcohol content (BAC) could be measured, positive results did not 
necessarily indicate guilt. Authorities still had much discretion in 
interpreting BAC test results. Moreover, the power of judicia l discretion 
was such that DUIA charges could be dropped to "lesser" charges 
through plea bargaining, and they often were, quite easily. Also, i f  a 
person were found guilty of DUIA, she/he was likely only to be fined, 
especially i f  the offense was not "chronic" in the sense that  it had been 
repeated to any extent. Even if  incarcerated, the DUIA offender  was 
often given lenient sentences in terms of length. Drivers-license 
suspensions were possible too, but only for generally short-term periods 
(i.e. ninety days). This summarizes the state of drinking-driv ing 
enforcement and prosecution practices as they existed from  the 
mid-1930s through the early 1980s, and these constitute what RID, 
MADD, and SADD saw as being weak points in DUIA law.
Formal Control of Drinking-Driving
Legal means of controlling drinking-driving has always been based 
upon ideas of formal deterrence. Such ideas are in turn  "grounded in 
the philosophical util itarianism  which views man as a p ro fi t  maximizer, 
that is, a calculator of p rofit  from estimates of gain and cost resulting 
from the projected act" (Larson, 1986:2). The concept of formal 
deterrence, then, suspends beneath the assumption that  prior to emitting 
a specific behavior, people will consciously weigh the benefits or gains 
of that act in light of the possible risks or costs. Proponents of formal 
deterrence feel that if  risks outweigh benefits, the behavior in question
will be constrained or prevented.
We can assume that  gains of driving a f te r  drinking are linked to 
the automobile’s convenience and effectiveness, both of which, it can 
be said, assist in creating a symbolic aura of ind iv iduality  and freedom 
associated with the automobile. Historically, however, costs appear 
trivial—a good chance for plea bargaining, payment of a f ine (most 
likely a small one at that) if  found guilty of DUIA, drivers’ license 
suspension (a drivers’ license is not necessary for one to operate a 
motor vehicle anyway), or incarceration (usually only if  one were a 
chronic or serious repeat offender)—all rather "light" costs. (Granted, 
some exception can be made for the last sanction.)
Anti-drinking-driving organizations sought to give added weight to 
DUIA costs. Through their efforts, they lobbied for s t i f fe r  sanctions; 
they sought to "get tough on drunk drivers" (Charleville, 1982). In 
accordance with demands made by these organizations many states began 
raising legal drinking ages to twenty-one, using portable BAC testing 
devices, requiring incarceration for those found to be guilty of DUIA, 
and recognizing deaths or serious injuries caused by drinking-driv ing as 
being results of felonious behavior. "Getting tough" took on a legal 
meaning; potential costs were raised.
Costs to drinking-driving are aimed to both "general" and "specific" 
modes of formal deterrence. While the former mode can be described as 
embodying a set of countermeasures designed to "influence. . .potential 
violators to re fra in  from a prohibited act through a desire to avoid the 
legal consequences. . .[regardless] of whether or not they have ever 
committed the offense in question," the latter "refers to the effec t  of
punishments experienced by convicted offenders in making them more 
sensitive to the consequences of the legal threat in their fu ture  
activities" (Ross, 1984a:8). Potential d rink ing  and driving costs do not 
discriminate between these general and specific categories as they 
attem pt to dissuade or deter all persons from driving a f te r  drinking, on 
the one hand, and are used as methods of dealing with apprehended 
drunken  drivers, on the other.
Three presuppositions underlie the success or failure  of formal 
deterrence regardless of whether it is general or specific. These are 
certainty, swiftness (or celerity), and severity. For deterrence to be 
successful, it is argued, perceived costs must be certain to occur, must 
occur swiftly, and must be severe enough to offbalance or counterset 
any benefits associated with the action in question. "Deviant behavior is 
assumed to be increasingly deterred i f  the probability of apprehension is 
high (certainty), i f  the time lapse between the act and punishment is 
low (celerity), and if  the sanctions and pains (severity) of punishment 
are high enough to outweigh the ’benefits’ derived from the criminal 
act" (Sykes, 1984:186).
A Critique of Formal Control
Proponents of the formal deterrence model do not generally rank 
certainty, celerity, or severity in order of importance as it is believed 
that each of these components are equally necessary deterrents of 
undesirable behavior. In practice, however, these components are often 
times ranked in order of occurrence. "Perception of risk [or certainty] 
is generally acknowledged as the key variable impacting individual
offensive behavior" (Larson, 1986:19). It is true that through the efforts 
of anti-drinking-driving the most crucial deterrence component, namely 
certainty, was affected; law-enforcement agencies, for example, have in 
many respects "tightened up" on apprehending drinking drivers. The 
severity and swiftness components were also modified as success was 
found in the halting of plea bargaining practices for DUIA charges. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that there are excessive monetary costs 
involved with saturating enforcement around drinking-driving. Since 
many jurisdictions cannot a ffo rd  this, especially for extended periods of 
time, DUIA enforcement is consequently deemphasized (Ross, 1984a). If 
certain ty  is put to question, swiftness and severity become less relevant 
concerns because the swift adm inistration of severe sanctions cannot 
follow without apprehension and conviction. Moreover, Moore and 
Gerstein inform  us that "even though we now spend significant sums 
enforcing [DUIA] laws and have more arrests nationwide for drunken 
driv ing than for any other offense, the probability of being arrested for 
drunken  driving is now estimated to be roughly 1 in 2,000" (1981:84). 
This fact in itself places certain ty  in a questionable position as 
evidently .0005 percent of all drunken  drivers at any given time are 
actually apprehended for DUIA.
Primarily for this reason, some have argued that formal deterrence, 
when applied in an e ffo r t  to "curb" drinking-driving, has produced moot 
results in terms of success (see especially Ross [1973, 1984a, and 1984b], 
Sykes [1984], and Votey [1984]). While individuals may tend to adhere 
to drinking-driving laws due to the initial threat of severe formal 
sanction, which are often given public meaning through media blitzes or
"initial periods of publicity" (Gusfield, 1984:32), patterns of drinking- 
driving appear likely to resume afte r  drivers’ experiences have revealed 
that the "threats of promised [apprehension and subsequent sanction] are 
bluffs" (Ross, 1984a:32). Even though drivers are cautious and avoid 
DUIA following a new wave of drinking-driving enforcement, their 
experiences will allow them to doubt the certainty of being apprehended 
for drinking-driving.
Several drinking-driving-law effectiveness studies have been done, 
and the key results need to be mentioned here. The f irs t  such study 
entitled "Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 
1967," involved analyzing frequencies of fatal, alcohol related t ra f f ic  
accidents in Great Britain prior to 1967 and comparing them with 
frequencies of accidents occurring afte r  the adm inistra tion of the Road 
Safety Act—an enforcement campaign designed to crack down on 
drinking drivers through the means of general deterrence (Ross, 1973). 
Beginning with the very initiation of the Act, Ross found a marked 
decrease in alcohol-related accidents, a decrease which continued 
through several months to follow. It is assumed here tha t  since alcohol- 
related accidents were declining, the frequency of drinking-driv ing itself 
was also declining, for alcohol-related accidents are indicative of an 
underlying drinking-driving rate. Nevertheless, the decline in fata l 
alcohol-related t ra f f ic  accidents was short-lived. Rates began to 
increase after  an initial eleven month decline. Moreover, the increase 
did not subsist until the frequency of fatal alcohol-related accidents had 
reached the pre-existing, pre-Road-Safety-Act mark.
Ross’s study has been replicated in other geographic
areas—including areas of the United States (see especially Riley, 1985; 
Hughes and Dodder, 1985; Shapiro and Votey, 1984; Votey, 1984; and 
N eff and Landrum, 1983). Hilton summarizes the results of such 
studies:
The general finding of these studies is that  de terren t effects 
are a t best temporary. Where t ra f f ic  accident levels have 
declined following the enactment of new countermeasures. . ., 
deterrent effects have been disappointingly short-lived, usually 
lasting for only a few months and never lasting for more than 
a year (Hilton, 1984:606).
It appears, then, as though formal efforts at deterring drinking-driving 
are not succeeding in any significant degree. When put into practice, 
formal deterrence appears to have many shortcomings. As such, if 
something is to be done to alleviate the publicly recognized 
drinking-driv ing problem, we must look to an alternative  means, one 
which displaces emphasis from the concept of form al deterrence.
Informal Intervention
In the context of an insightful discussion on the fu tu re  directions 
of DUIA research, Meier et al. state:
To date, deterrence has focused on detection and punishment, 
with treatm ent where appropriate. The possibility of 
preventing the intoxicated person from driv ing at a point 
prior to which the person might ord inarily  drive has not been 
systematically investigated (1984:520).
Recently, a handfu l of sociologists interested in answering the 
question "What can be done about drinking and driving?" have 
apparently  become attentive to the call of Meier et al. and have 
focused on informal deterrence or peer intervention. The concept of
informal deterrence is not new to the discipline of sociology as it 
constitutes a part of what can be called the group process (see Cuber, 
1947:Chapter IX). Informal deterrence (or peer intervention) pertains 
to any form of informal social pressure emphasizing conformity and 
social stability. The powerful role peers play in the shaping of 
ano ther’s behavior has been a major influence in the building of several 
sociological theories, theories constructed on the micro, 
social-psychological level. Within these frameworks or conceptualizations 
of reality  lies a central tenet:
In any group the members of that group share normative 
expectations regarding how people with specified social 
characteristics will (not) and should (not) behave in specified 
circumstances. . . .Failure to conform  to. . .shared normative 
expectations is greeted with reactions of surprise, negative 
evaluation, and the application of more or less severe negative 
sanctions by members of the group or their surrogates 
(Kaplan, 1975:5).
Hence, group members form a collective entity  or aggregated body, and 
the harmonious existence of that body necessitates conformity to mutual 
norms.
Sutherland has noted the importance of group membership in 
conveying accepted definitions of behavior to members. He contends 
that accepted standards of behavior are "learned in interaction with 
o ther persons in a process of communication [and that] the principle 
part  of the learning. . .occurs w ithin intimate personal [primary] 
groups" (1947:5-6). To be sure, Sutherland’s theory of "differential 
association" is intended to explain delinquent behavior or social 
deviance; however, the tenets of his theory are conceptually useful for 
understanding "conformist" behavior as well. Whether a group defines
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as acceptable behavior which is deviant or conformist, the point here is 
that members of that group are taught ways of behaving, thinking, and 
even believing through interactions or associations with other members.
The concept, "informal intervention," used in conjunction with the 
study of drinking-driving finds support in the writings of Waller who 
points to the fact that the legal approach toward the drinking-driving 
problem should actually be seen as secondary to "public education aimed 
a t public and self regulation of the drinking driver" (1987:58). Reed 
elaborates on what is meant by the phrase, "public regulation of the 
drinking driver," commenting that it involves all "countermeasures that 
seek to influence those around potential d runk  drivers. . .to prevent 
them from driving while intoxicated" (1981:342). Thus inform al DUIA 
intervention refers to any e ffo r t  taken to sway or attempt to deter a 
peer from driving after  that person has had too much to drink.
Specific steps which informal DUIA interveners can take in effort  
to control drinking-driving include (1) threatening negative sanction and 
thereby making driving a f te r  drinking appear socially unacceptable, (2) 
offering  to have a friend, taxi, or even themselves escort the intoxicated 
person home, (3) physically restraining the intoxicated person to the 
extent that  to drive would be inconceivable (e.g. taking car keys from 
intoxicated person), or (4) threatening to report the intoxicated person’s 
behavior to the police i f  she/he insists on driving. These are all 
potentially effective methods or techniques of intervention, and they 
operate a t the level of informal social control (although in the last 
instance a threat may be made to bring intervention to the formal 
level).
In a landmark study Rabow, Hernandez, and Watts document some 
empirical evidence which suggests that "college students intervene 
surprisingly often to prevent the convergence of drinking and driving" 
(1986:224-225). Rabow, et al. obtained data from a convenience 
sampling of 210 students enrolled in an introductory sociology course at 
U.C.L.A. during the Fall of 1980. Eighty-one percent of these students 
reported to have "tried to stop someone from driving because [they] felt 
he/she was too drunk  to drive." Moreover, the authors found that the 
two techniques of intervention most frequently  reported are (1) "telling 
people they are too drunk to drive" and (2) "arranging] for someone 
else to drive the intoxicated person home." The technique of intervention 
employed least often in potential drinking-driving situations, according 
to the authors, is "threatening to stop a person from  driving." Examples 
of this include threatening to physically constrain the intoxicated 
person, threatening to take keys from intoxicated person, and 
threatening to notify  police about the intoxicated person i f  tha t  person 
were to proceed to drive anyway.
In their conclusions, Rabow, et al. summarize by stating that 
attempted interventions reported by the respondents "seemed to be 
highly successful," a statement which leads to a more powerful point: 
"Reducing drunk driving through informal social control. . .may prove 
more effective than e fforts  aimed at more distant causes, including 
increased policing, arrest, or punishment" (1986:225). The tone and 
connotation of this last statement indicate, and for purposes here 
reiterate, a point made earlier: formal deterrence fall short of its 
desried mark when used to adequately reduce the incidence of
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drinking-driving.
In a follow-up publication by Hernandez and Rabow (1986:269-271), 
the authors analyze the "character" of student interventions as 
d iffe ren tia ted  in public and private potential drinking-driv ing situations. 
They found their respondents more likely to be drinking-driv ing "after 
leaving a party  or a f r iend’s home than [after  leaving] a bar or 
restaurant." The authors also state that "there were no major 
d ifferences in the type of intervention imposed in the d iffe ren t 
situations or locations." Again, Hernandez and Rabow reported that 
being told not to drive a f te r  drinking was "the most frequently  imposed 
intervention," but they also point out that "the most successful 
intervention. . .is being driven home." Hernandez and Rabow conclude 
by inviting fu r the r  research in the area of informal DUIA intervention; 
in their words, "Additional research needs to continue to identify  the 
situational (. . .place), social (status and age), and personal factors that 
influence whether [intervention] attempts are beneficial." They also 
make reference to the shortcomings of formal deterrence by claiming 
that their findings "hold promise given the fa i lu re  of [such] 
deterrence."
Given that  (1) drinking-driving is a public problem; (2) formal 
deterrence when applied to DUIA has its shortcomings, and (3) methods 
of informal deterrence seem to offer the promise of a new means of 
dealing with the problem, it is my aim to pursue a greater 
understanding of the drinking-driving issue through understanding the 
dynamics of inform al intervention. Unquestionably, I follow the direct 
lead of Rabow, Hernandez, and Watts (1986) and and the invitation of
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Hernandez and Rabow (1986), for specific research questions guiding this 
thesis were gleaned from the work of these authors. Problem 
definitions are as follow:
1) Are individuals inclined to intervene in potential drinking-driving 
situations? If so, what types of intervention techniques are most 
often employed?
2) Which intervention techniques tend to produce the best results?
3) Which settings of intervention appear to be most conducive to 
positive results?
4) Which persons attempting intervention are most successful in 
deterring the potential drinking-driver?
5) Do selected demographic and /o r  social psychological characteristics 
appear to be predictors of those who intervene as contrasted to those 
who do not?
The f irs t  question involves the replication of the Rabow, et al.
(1986) study. The second, third, and fourth  questions, draw from 
Hernandez and Rabow (1986). The f i f th  question offers something novel 
in informal DUIA intervention literature  to date. Since fu ll  disclosure 
of research methods is a m andate of systematic exploration and 
description, I will continue by addressing the specific techniques I have 
used in seeking answers to these questions, then in the chapter 
following answers will be presented.
Chapter Two 
RESEARCH METHODS
This chapter shall describe the steps taken in gathering data for 
this research agenda. The discussion will include a description of the 
questionnaire (see Appendix A), the sampling technique, and key 
variables which underlie the research. Before discussing these issues, 
however, the logic behind the specific data collection technique I have 
used must be addressed.
Data-Collection Technique
Q uantitatively oriented sociologists are well-known for employing 
questionnaires as instruments of da ta  collection, and they have 
developed several d iffe ren t techniques of administering them (e.g., 
telephone, mail, face-to-face, and self-administered). Although each 
technique can be evaluated in terms of positive and negative points, 
none is inherently  any better than another in a pure or generic sense.
As Frey shows, "The research design, including the data-gathering 
phase, depends on the nature of the problem being studied, the nature 
of the population being researched, and the extent of resources 
available" (1983:27-8). These, then, are the prim ary factors upon which 
any mode of data gathering should be justified: the problem, population, 
and allocatable resources.
The data  for this thesis were gathered via a self-administered 
questionnaire. Since the point of interest throughout this research is 
informal DUIA intervention and since the specified problem definitions 
inherent to this research involve gathering standardized data from a
category of young persons generally known for frequent drinking 
practices (see Gallup Report, 1985:12) and high t ra f f ic  mortality rates 
(Nevada Department of Transportation, 1985:357), data were collected 
via a questionnaire. Because a large amount of monetary resources 
were not available to allocate toward the administration of this 
questionnaire, the self-administered technique, as opposed to other more 
costly ones such as mail or telephone, was employed. Additionally, the 
specific population chosen to be surveyed was that  of college students 
as they were also the most easily accessible. In short, the most 
e ffic ien t means of questionnaire adm in is tra t ion -g iven  the research 
problem, available resources, and the popula tion-w as selected.
Research Variables
The questionnaire (Appendix A) consisted of various items and 
indices designed to bring insight to inform al DUIA intervention and 
hypothesized correlates. Measurements of inform al intervention were 
obtained in three dimensions. First, respondents were asked to 
indicate whether or not they had ever made an e ffo r t  at intervening in 
a potential DUIA situation. If so, they were asked to specify their 
relationship with the object (i.e. intervenee) of their last intervention 
attempt, the site at which the attempted intervention occurred, the 
technique of intervention tried, and the success of that attempt.
Second, the respondents were asked to indicate whether there were 
times they could have attempted a DUIA intervention but decided not 
to do so. Similar to the f irst dimension of informal intervention, 
contingency questions to this item included the respondent’s relationship
with the potential intervenee and the site a t  which intervention could 
have been attempted. Respondents were also asked to give a reason or 
their rationale for failing to attempt intervention. Finally, respondents 
were asked if  they had ever been in the role of the intervenee, and if  
so, they were asked to identify  their relationship with the intervener, 
the site at which intervention occurred, the technique of intervention 
employed, and the success of that intervention.
The questionnaire also contained a series of items designed to 
ascertain how severe respondents feel specific legislative sanctions 
associated with drinking-driving are. There are three general 
dimensions here as well, and they consist of sanctions appropriate for 
first-and second-time DUIA offenders, offenders with three or more 
DUIA charges, and offenders who seriously injure or kill another 
person. iriany sanctions itemized under each of these dimensions 
represent legal consequences for DUIA in the State of Nevada (Finche 
and Vande Brake, 1985).
One hypothesized direct correlate to inform al DUIA intervention 
involves self-concept assumptions. Respondents were asked to express 
indications of their self-images by responding to a self-esteem scale 
which follows a semantic d ifferen tia l format.
Measurements on selected demographic factors—e.g. sex, age, 
marital status, race, college-class standing, employment, and religious 
preference—were also obtained through the questionnaire. Interspersed 
throughout all indices of variables mentioned are several items designed 
to measure the extent to which respondents agree (or disagree) with 
statements about drinking-driving in general. Although these items
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generally fu lfil l  transitional functions within the questionnaire body as a 
whole, they also elicit some interesting descriptive data  about how 
serious respondents feel the DUIA issue is and how effective respondents 
feel formal deterrence is in dealing with the problem.
Sampling Technique
The method of respondent selection used in this research falls 
under the category of nonprobability sampling and therefore  does not 
produce a random or scientific sample. The label given to the specific 
nonprobability sampling procedure used is "convenience sampling."
Because this technique was employed, it is inappropria te  to use 
probability-based statistical techniques (i.e. param etric  statistics) in data 
analysis (see Kachigan, 1986 or any such statistics text). Hence, data 
analysis consists of descriptive statistical measures which include not 
only the reporting (and interpreting) of response frequencies, but also of 
measures of association and chi square significance tests. At no time is 
it implied that findings are to be generalized to an underlying 
population.
Questionnaire Administration
Questionnaires were administered to several introductory-level 
sociology classes at the University  of Nevada, Las Vegas and Clark 
County Community College during early-March of 1988. As each class 
was approached, students were briefly introduced to the research topic.
It was emphasized that all participation in this study was to be 
voluntary. Those students choosing to participate were also told that all
responses would be kept strictly confidential. These points were 
repeated in writing within the introductory portion of the questionnaire 
body.
A researcher was present while the questionnaires were completed 
in order to answer respondent questions and to prevent consultation 
among them. Respondents were provided adequate time in which to 
complete the instrument. Once all respondents in a given class were 
finished, questionnaires were collected in bulk so as to again ensure 
confidentiality . Finally, the instruments were numerically coded to ease 
entry onto an SPSS data file.
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Chapter Three 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Data for this study were gathered from 195 student respondents. 
Respondent ages ranged from 17 to 60 years. F if ty -four percent were 
under age 21; 30 percent, 21 to 25, and the remaining 16 percent, 26 
and above. The median age is 20. Eighty-two percent reported to have 
been single and never married, and 66 percent referred  to themselves as 
being full-time students. In terms of college class standing, 40 percent 
indicated that they were freshmen; 35 percent, sophomores; 17 percent, 
juniors; and 8 percent seniors. The m ajority of respondents--56 
percent—were females.
According to 97 percent of the respondents, the combination of 
drinking and driving does pose a serious threa t  to the safety of Las 
Vegas area residents. This finding comes as no surprise given that 80 
percent believed the DUIA rate in this geographical area to be high 
and that 83 percent fe lt  most drivers, at one time or another, had 
driven under the influence of alcohol. Sixty-nine percent either 
disagreed or were undecided about a questionnaire item praising local 
law enforcement officers for the effec tive  work they do in identify ing 
most of the drunken  drivers in the Las Vegas area.
It is of interest to note how the d runken  driv ing public problem 
compares to other such problems in the Southern Nevada area, at least 
in terms of stated respondent perception. While 84 percent of all 
respondents perceived drunken driving to be a very serious matter, six 
percent less (78 percent) felt as strongly about drug abuse compared 
with 72 percent who felt  as strongly about AIDS and 52 percent who
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perceived air pollution as being very serious. Thus, even when 
compared to some of the most widely recognized problems facing the 
greater Las Vegas area today, drinking-driving stands among the top 
according sentiments of the survey sample (consult Table 1).
When asked about the severity level of formal sanctions applied to 
known DUIA offenders, 36 percent of the respondents stated that two 
days of jail for first-  and second-time offenders was "just right" while 
52 percent felt it was not enough (see Table 2). Sixty-three percent, 
however, thought six months of jail time for the same offense category 
too severe, and here the percentage of those who stated that  two days 
was just right declined to 25. Just over ha lf  the respondents (51 
percent) felt tha t  a f ine of $1,000 was appropriate  while less than a 
third (29 percent) viewed that  as being too severe. Fifty-one percent 
believed that 48 hours of community service work was an adequate 
sanction for first-  and second-time offenders, and 50 percent thought 
that  such offenders should lose driving privileges fo r  a period of 90 
days. Only 7 percent of all respondents felt that mandatory enrollment 
of offenders into alcohol-education courses was too severe, and half 
believed that m andatory rehabilita tion was too severe as well.
Concerning the chronic, repeat DUIA o ffender  (defined by Nevada 
Revised Statute 484.379 as a person who is apprehended and convicted 
of driving a f te r  drinking more than two times w ith in  a seven year 
period), only 18 percent of the respondents fe lt  that  a six-year prison 
sentence was appropriate; the vast majority, 73 percent, found such a 
formal sanction too severe (Table 3). Yet, 43 percent approved of a 
three-year sentence by indicating that it was just right, and 23 percent
Table 1
PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF VARIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
CONFRONTING SOUTHERN NEVADA 
(in percent)
Social Very Not
Problem Serious Serious Serious TOT;
Drunken Driving 84 13 4 101
(163) (25) (7) (195)
Drug Abuse 78 20 1 99
(153) (39) (3) (195)
Child Abuse 73 23 4 100
(143) (44) (8) (195)
AIDS 72 24 4 100
(140) (47) (8) (195)
Poverty 53 42 5 100
(104) (82) (9) (195)
Air Pollution 51 40 9 100
(99) (79) (17) (195)
Racism 50 40 9 99
(98) (79) (18) (195)
Sexism 41 48 11 100
(80) (94) (21) (195)
Prostitution 41 41 17 99
(80) (81) (34) (195)
Table 2
PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF SANCTIONS 
FOR FIRST- AND SECOND-TIME 
DUIA OFFENDERS 
(in percent)
Sanction Too Severe Just Right Not Enough TOTAL
Two Days
Jail 12 36 52 100
(23) (70) (102) (195)
Six Months
Jail 63 25 12 100
(123) (49) (23) (195)
$1000 Fine 29 51 19 99
(57) (100) (38) (195)
Community
Service
(48 hours) 6 51 43 100
(12) (100) (83) (195)
Driver
License
Suspension
(90 days) 24 50 26 100
(47) (97) (51) (195)
Alcohol
Abuse Course 7 64 29 100
(14) (124) (57) (195)
Alcoholism
Treatm ent 50 31 19 100
(97) (60) (38) (195)
Table 3
PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF SANCTIONS 
FOR REPEAT DUIA OFFENDERS 
(in percent)
Sanction Too Severe Just R ight Not Enough TOTAL
Three Year
Prison Term 34 43 23 100
(66) (84) (45) (195)
Six Year
Prison Term 73 18 8 99
(143) (36) (16) (195)
$5,000 Fine 21 57 22 100
(41) (111) (43) (195)
Alcohol
Abuse Classes 3 49 49 101
(5) (95) (95) (195)
Alcoholism
Treatment 12 55 33 100
(23) (108) (64) (195)
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believed this sanction to be not severe enough. A majority fifty-seven 
percent of the respondents were in favor of a $5,000 fine  for the 
repeatoffender, and 55 percent felt that placing these offenders into 
alcoholism rehabilita tion facilities was appropriate.
Two thirds of the respondents felt that  a six-year prison term is 
too lenient for DUIA offenders who cause death or serious bodily injury 
to others while only 12 percent viewed the sanction as being too severe 
(see Table 4). When considering a ten-year prison term for these 
offenders, 37 percent of the respondents felt that to be an acceptable 
punishment, and another 36 percent believed it to be lacking in severity. 
Interestingly, a twenty-year prison sentence was considered too severe 
by 60 percent of the respondents, yet 28 percent indicated that this was 
just right. According to respondent sentiments on this issue, then, it 
appears as though the optimal formal sanction fall somewhere within the 
ten- to twenty-year range. Fifty-six percent of the respondents, I 
might add, did not feel that alcoholism rehabilita tion was severe enough 
although 37 percent felt it  would be adequate, presumably in combination 
with an additional sanction(s).
Regardless of how severe, appropriate, or lenient specific formal 
DUIA sanctions appear to respondents, only 26 percent thought that 
DUIA sanctions—in general usage of the term —are more severe than 
public concern would dictate. This statement, of course, connotes that 
the vast m ajority (74 percent) of respondents e ither considered formal 
sanctions as being appropriate  or wanting in terms of severity.
Nevertheless, although one-tenth of the respondents expressed 
uncertainty on the matter, almost one-half of them were confident that
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Table 4
PERCEIVED SEVERITY OF SANCTIONS 
FOR DUIA OFFENDERS WHO CAUSE 
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY 
HARM TO OTHERS 
(in percent)
Sanction Too Severe Just Right Not Enough TOTAL
Six Year
Prison Term 12 23 66 101
(23) (44) (128) (195)
Ten Year
Prison Term 26 37 36 99
(51) (74) (70) (195)
Twenty Year
Prison Term 60 28 12 100
(117) (55) (23) (195)
$5,000 Fine 6 33 61 100
(11) (65) (119) (195)
Alcohol Abuse
Classes 3 32 65 100
(6) (63) (126) (195)
Alcoholism
Treatment 7 37 56 100
(13) (72) (110) (195)
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the threat of arrest and prosecution-elements of the formal deterrence 
model discussed earlier—does not prevent motorists from driving after  
drinking. Moreover, only 41 percent fe lt  that a person who insists on 
driving a f te r  drinking will eventually be arrested (and implicitly 
prosecuted) for DUIA. In sum, most respondents expressed skepticism in 
reference to the effectiveness of formal deterrence in countering 
drinking-driving; certainty or the influence threat of arrest and 
prosecution have on undesirable behavior is lacking according to the 
perception of many respondents as is severity of sanction. It is 
surprising that less than one-quarter of the respondents (22 percent) 
contend that driving after  drinking is actually a socially acceptable form 
of behavior as this appears to counter the sentiments of the majority.
That is, one might expect socially unacceptable forms of behavior like 
drinking-driving not only to be dissuaded formally, but also to have the 
public recognize the effectiveness of that  formal dissuasion. If  this is 
not recognized, is the behavior really socially unacceptable?
The Social Dymanics of Intervention:
Understanding the Phenomenon 
Through Actors, Settings, 
and Techniques
Informal Interveners
Eighty-three percent (n=162) of the respondents constitute a 
subsample of informal DUIA interveners; these respondents reported to 
have at one time or another attempted to stop someone from  driving 
a f te r  tha t  person had been drinking. Of the subsample, 32 percent 
reported their last attempt a t intervention to have occurred w ith in  the
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past month (meaning one month preceding the date questionnaires were 
administered) while another 32 percent indicated that their last attempt 
had occurred within the past six months (refer to Table 5). Nineteen 
percent of the respondents constituting the subsample of interveners 
reported having intervened six months to one year prior to the data 
collection phase of this study, and the remaining 17 percent claimed to 
have attempted intervention over one year prior to that time. In short, 
over ha lf  of the intervention attempts reported by respondents were said 
to have occurred within the six months prior to questionnaire 
administration. Thus, the majority of the intervening respondents were 
probably relatively clear in recalling their specific intervention attempts.
The person most frequently  intervened upon (i.e. the modal 
intervenee) was a friend  of the respondent intervener. Hence, the 
person receiving interventive treatment in 74 percent of all reported 
attempts was defined as this. While same-sex friends were objects of 
intervention in 43 percent of these attempts, f riends of the opposite 
sex were interv.enees in the other 31 percent of the cases. Parents, 
siblings, and other relatives (including spouses) were reported as being 
targets of intervention by approximately one-tenth of the intervening 
respondents, while a mere 2 percent reported to have intervened in 
situations involving co-workers (unless the co-worker was also a friend 
in the sense that the association between that person and the 
respondent transcended the work place, which was indicated by 4 
percent of those constituting the intervener subsample.) Finally, only 6 
percent of the respondent interveners claimed to have intervened in a 
situation involving a stranger. Table 6 presents a summary of these
Table 5
TIME OF OCCURRENCE OF REPORTED 
LAST INTERVENTIVE EFFORT 
(in percent)
Time of Occurrence Frequency
Less Than One Month 
Prior to Questionnaire
Administration 32
(52)
One to Six Months Prior
to Questionnaire Administration 32
(52)
Six Months to One Year 
Prior to Questionnaire
Administration 19
(31)
More Than One Year Prior
to Questionnaire Administration 17
(27)
100
(162) *
* The figure  162 represents the total number of respondents reporting 
to have ever attempted in tervention in a drinking-driv ing situation. 
This figure  is equal to 83 percent of all respondents surveyed; thus, 
one can deduce that 17 percent of those surveyed reported never 
having attempted intervention.
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Table 6
CATEGORIES OF PERSONS RECEIVING 
RESPONDENT INTERVENTION 
(in percent)
Intervenees Frequency
Friend of Same Sex 43
(70)
Friend of Opposite Sex 31
(51)
Relative 10
(17)
Stranger 6
(9)
Friend and Co-worker 4
(7)
Co-worker 2
(4)
Other** 2
(4)
98
(162)*
* Again, the figure 162 represents the total number of respondents 
constituting the subsample of interveners.
** The category labeled, "other," is comprised of night club or lounge 
patrons. Two percent of the respondent interveners indicated to 
have intervened while they were working as bartenders/barmaids. 
This category may have been collapsed into tha t  of "stranger;" 
however, since the category is characterized by a unique 
homogeneity of elements, it is, perhaps, better left as it is. "Other," 
then, is synonymous to lounge patron for interpretive purposes here.
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findings.
The social settings hosting the majority of all reported 
intervention techniques include parties and bars /n igh t clubs. The modal 
response here, indicated by 38 percent of the respondent interveners, 
was "party" while 6 percent less claimed to have last attempted 
intervention at a public drinking-establishment. Intervention attempts 
made at the home of a friend  were reported by 13 percent of the 
intervening respondents, and 9 percent reported intervening in potential 
drinking-driving situations at their own homes. (Parties, regardless of 
whether they were held at a f r iend’s home or a respondent’s home, were 
coded only in the "party" category; it is presumed that interventions 
reported to have occurred at a f r iend ’s or respondent’s home did not 
occur during a party  as defined by the respondents reporting these 
places as sites of intervention.) Less frequently  reported settings of 
intervention were at restaurants or at work, both of which were 
reported by 2 percent of the interveners (see Table 7).
The specific technique of drinking-driv ing intervention most often 
reported by respondent interveners is to take direct control of the 
situation and drive the intervenee one’s self; this was reported by 
one-quarter of the interveners. While 5 percent claimed to have 
arranged for their objects of intervention to be driven home by another 
person, 7 percent verbally told that person not to drive and left it at 
that. Other reported techniques include o ffer ing  to follow the 
intoxicated person home (reported by 2 percent), threatening to prevent 
the intoxicated person from  driving (stated by 1 percent), actually 
preventing the intoxicated person from driv ing (indicated by 8 percent),
Table 7
REPORTED SETTINGS OF RESPONDENT INTERVENTION
(in percent)
Setting Frequency
Party 38
(62)
B ar/N ight Club 32
(52)
F riend’s Home 13
(21 )
Own Home 9
(14)
Restaurant 2
(3)
Work 2
(3)
Other* 4
(7)
100
(162)**
The category labeled, "other," here refers to all attempted 
interventions occurring at a site other than those offered  on the 
questionnaire. Specific "others" include parking lots (reported by 
four respondents), service stations (given by two respondents), and 
the highway (stated by a respondent who happened to be employed 
a police officer.)
The figure 162 represents a subsample of respondents.
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Table 8
REPORTED TECHNIQUES OF RESPONDENT INTERVENTION
(in percent)
Intervention
Techniques Frequency
SINGLE TECHNIQUES
Drive the Intervenee 25 (41)
Prevent Intervenee from Driving 8 (13)
Tell Intervenee Not to Drive 7 (12)
Have Someone Drive Intervenee 5 (8)
O ffer  to Follow Intervenee 2 (4)
Have Intervenee Stay 2 (4)
Threaten to Prevent Intervenee 
from Driving 2 (3)
Single Technique Total: 51 (85)
MULTIPLE TECHNIQUES
Tell Intervenee Not to D rive/ 
Drive Intervenee 16 (26)
Threaten Intervenee/
Prevent Intervenee from Driving/ 
Drive Intervenee 9 (15)
Tell Intervenee Not to D rive/ 
Prevent Intervenee from D riv ing/ 
Drive Intervenee 7 (12)
Prevent Intervenee from D riv ing/ 
Drive Intervenee 7 (11)
Tell Intervenee Not to D rive/ 
Prevent Intervenee from Driving 6 (9)
Other Multiple Techniques 2 (4)
Multiple Technique Total: 47 (77)
TOTAL 98 (162)*
* The figure 162 represents the total subsample of interveners.
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and having the intoxicated person stay somewhere to which she/he was 
not required to drive (said by another 2 percent). These findings are 
displayed in Table 8.
Almost half of the respondent interveners (46 percent) reported to 
have used multiple techniques during their last intervention effort.
Chief among these mixed techniques are telling the intoxicated person 
not to drive then driving that person home (16 percent), threatening the 
intoxicated person and subsequently preventing he r/h im  from driving 
then driving that person home (9 percent), telling the intoxicated person 
not to drive then preventing he r/h im  from driving and driving that 
person home (7 percent), preventing the intoxicated person from  driving 
then driving he r/h im  home (another 7 percent), and telling the 
intoxicated person not to drive then preventing he r/h im  from driving (6 
percent). The other 4 percent of reported multiple techniques are 
comprised of other combinations of the individual techniques listed in 
Table 8, and these are included under the "other multiple techniques" 
category.
Prior to crosstabulating the various dimensions of intervention 
discussed thus fa r  (i.e. intervenee, intervention setting, and technique of 
intervention) with the dependent variable, intervention success, it  is 
practical to draw some comparison to the findings presented in the 
Rabow, Hernandez, and Watts (1986). First, this study found a similar 
proportion of intervening respondents in their sample (128 of 170, or 81 
percent) as has been presented here (162 of 195, or 83 percent). This 
seems to suggest tha t  there is a particu lar social pattern  underlying 
attempted drinking-driving interventions even though neither this or the
Rabow, et al. study employed tenets of representative (i.e. probability) 
sampling. Second, while the response "driving the intervenee home" was 
the most frequently  reported single technique of intervention here, the 
most frequent response reported by Rabow, et al. is "telling people they 
arc too drunk to drive" (1986: 224). This d ifference  might point to a 
change in the content of intervention attempts; perhaps more people 
today are viewing drinking-driving as a social ill as compared to the 
proportion who did in 1986, and perhaps as more people come to realize 
that drinking-driving is a public problem they are employing more 
intrusive means of dealing with it.
Table 9 contains a crosstabulation of data found in Table 
6--categories of intervenees--by success. Success, it must be said, 
refers to whether or not a given e ffo rt  of intervention achieved a 
desirable end, i.e. deterred a person from driving a f te r  drinking. As 
Table 9 indicates, 81 percent of all reported attempted interventions 
were characterized by a successful outcome. Success rates are shown 
to remain relatively constant through all categories of intervenees with, 
of course, the exception of that category labeled "other," where the 
success rate declines to 50 percent. Disregarding this one exception, 
rates of success range from 80 to 100 percent. Moreover, and contrary 
to the belief that interventions may be most successfully attempted when 
there exists a personal or intimate relationship between the intervener 
and intervenee, it is evident that even without the existence of such a 
relationship, the success rate remains high. This is evidenced by the 
fact that attempted interventions were said to be successful in 89 
percent of the cases involving a stranger as intervenee and all cases
Table 9
CATEGORY OF INTERVENEE BY INTERVENTION SUCCESS
(in percent)
Intervenee
Friend of 
Same Sex
Friend of
Opposite
Sex
Relative
Stranger
Friend and 
Co-worker
Co-worker
Other
Successful Unsuccessful
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
80
(56)
20
(14)
100
(70)
82 18 100
(42) (9) (51)
82 8 100
(14) (3) (17)
89 11 100
(8) (1) (9)
86 14 100
(6) (1) (7)
100 0 100
(4) (0) (4)
50 50 100
(2) (2) (4)
81 30 100
(132) (19) (162)
Chi Square = 4.19 with 6 d.f. 
N.S.
Cram er’s V = 0.16
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involving a co-worker not considered to be a friend  as well.
Cramer’s V is the measure of association between the dependent 
variable (intervention success) and the independent variable (category of 
intervenee) in Table 9. The Cramer’s V value of 0.16 indicates there is 
an extremely weak relationship between these variables. Moreover, the 
chi square (4.19) suggests that the arrangement of data in Table 9 is 
the result of chance as that  value is less than  the 12.59 value required 
for significance at the .05 level of confidence with 6 degrees of 
freedom. In short, the weak association between intervention success 
and category of intervenee is not statistically significant. We must 
therefore fail to reject the implied null hypothesis stating that 
successful intervention is contingent on the intervenee category.
Despite this fact, however, the most important in terpreta tion gleaned 
from Table 9 data is that intervention attempts are generally successful. 
Again, eighty-one percent of those reporting to have attempted 
intervention also stated that their attempts were successful, or in other 
words, that they were able to deter drinking-driv ing behavior.
Data portraying the statistical relationship between intervention 
success and setting of intervention are located in Table 10. While 
reported intervention attempts were most frequently  made at party 
settings, such a setting was least conducive to intervention success 
with the exceptions of the work, restaurant, and other settings. This 
is indicated by the fact that 79 percent of all in terventions attempted at 
a parties were successful as compared with 86 percent of those 
attempted a the home of a friend, 87 percent of those attempted at a 
bar on night club, and 93 percent of those tried at a respondent’s own
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Table 10
CATEGORY OF INTERVENTION SETTING BY SUCCESS
(in percent)
Successful Unsuccessful
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
Setting
Party 79 21 100
(49) (13) (62)
Bar/N ight Club 87 13 100
(45) (7) (52)
F riend’s Home 86 14 100
(18) (3) (21)
Own Home 93 7 100
(13) (1) (14)
Restaurant 67 33 100
(2) (1) (3)
Work 67 33 100
(2) (1) (3)
Other 43 57 100
(3) (4) (7)
81 ~19 "TOO"
(132) (30) (162)
Chi Square = 10.36 with 6 d.f. 
N.S.
Cramer’s V = 0.25
home. Nevertheless, only 67 percent of all in tervention efforts  
reported to have occurred at both restaurants and work sites were 
successful. Again, these are the least likely settings of attempted 
interventions. The percentage differences from setting to setting are 
generally small, however.
The Cramer’s V value for Table 10 equals 0.25. As with the 
findings of Table 9, this means that the dependent variable 
(intervention success) is weakly associated with the independent 
variable (intervention setting). Hence, there is no evidence supporting 
the notion that intervention setting has any bearing on intervention 
success. Regardless of the settings in which reported intervention 
attempts occurred, however, the m ajority of them (81 percent) were 
successful. That is an important finding. The chi square value 
corresponding to Table 10 indicates that the arrangement of data  is not 
significant at the .05 confidence level.
Table 11 presents a crosstabulation of data pertaining to 
intervention technique by data gathered on success of intervention. 
Techniques considered for Table 11 consist of single intervention 
techniques only. (Table 12 contains data showing multiple intervention 
techniques.)
As the Cramer’s V value (0.68) indicates, there exists a strong 
relationship between the technique of attempted intervention and 
intervention success. Specific single techniques that appear conducive to 
intervention success include having the intervenee stay someplace to 
which she/he did not have to drive (successful in all reported attempts), 
driv ing the intervenee one’s self (successful in 98 percent of the
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Table 11
INTERVENTION TECHNIQUE BY SUCCESS OF INTERVENTION
(Single Techniques Only)
(in percent)
Successful Unsuccessful 
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
Single Technique
Drive the 
Intervenee
Prevent Intervenee 
from Driving
Tell Intervenee 
Not to Drive
Have Someone 
Drive
Offer  to Follow 
Intervenee
Have Intervenee 
Stay
Threaten to 
Prevent Intervenee 
from Driving
98 (40) 
85 (11) 
25 (3) 
50 (4) 
25 (1) 
100 (4)
67 (2)
2 ( 1) 
15 (2) 
75 (9) 
50 (4) 
75 (3) 
0 (0)
100 (41) 
100 (13) 
100 ( 12) 
100 (8) 
100 (4)
100 (4)
33 (1) 100 (3)
76 (65) 24 (20) 100 (85)
Chi Square = 39.83 with 6 d.f. 
P < .01
Cramer’s V = 0.68
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reported attempts), preventing the intervenee from driving (successful 
in 85 percent of the attempts), and threatening to prevent the 
intervenee from driving (successful in 67 percent of the reported cases). 
Techniques impeding intervention successes include telling the 
intervenee not to drive and offering to follow the intervenee, both of 
which are not only successful for one quarter  of the reported attempts 
but are also rather "passive" or unintrusive methods. Finally, one 
technique which neither appears to promote nor impede the success of 
attempted interventions is for the intervener to arrange for someone to 
drive the intervenee (successful for half of the trails).
The chi square value of Table 11 indicates that the data  contained 
within that table are arranged in a statistically significant manner as 
39.83 exceeds the minimum value required to reject the null hypothesis 
at the .01 level of confidence. Thus, we can assert that  there is a 
genuine relationship between reported single technique of intervention 
and success and that  the data arrangement is not a ttr ibu tab le  to chance 
alone.
Table 12 contains data similar to those of Table 11; both contain 
crosstabulations of intervention technique by intervention success. The 
difference between the tables is that whereas Table 11 treated single 
technique as the independent variable, Table 12 considers multiple 
techniques. The Cramer’s V value (0.33) calculated from  the data of 
Table 12 indicates a moderate statistical association between multiple 
technique attempts a t intervention and intervention success.
Nevertheless, it must be stated that regardless of which combination of 
single techniques was employed, interveners reporting having used these
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Table 12
INTERVENTION TECHNIQUE BY SUCCESS OF INTERVENTION
(Multiple Techniques)
(in percent)
Successful Unsuccessful
Interventions Interventions TOTAL
Multiple Technique
Tell Intervenee Not 
to D rive/
Drive Intervenee 96 (25) 4 (1) 100 (26)
Threaten to Prevent 
In tervenee/
Prevent Intervenee/
Drive Intervenee 100 (15) 0 (0) 100 (15)
Tell Intervenee Not 
to D rive/
Prevent Intervenee/
Drive Intervenee 100 (12) 0 (0) 100 (12)
Prevent Intervenee 
from D riv ing/
Drive Intervenee 91(10) 9 (1) 100 (11)
Tell Intervenee Not 
to D rive/
Prevent Intervenee
from Driving 78 (7) 22 (2) 100 (9)
Other Multiple
Technique 75 (3) 25 (1) 100 (4)
94 (72) ~6 (5) 100 (77)
Chi Square = 8.27 with 5 d.f. 
N.S.
Cram er’s V = 0.33
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were extremely successful in deterring driving a f te r  drinking. The 
over-all success rate of reported multiple techniques is 94 percent. 
Furthermore, it appears as though the most successful of the multiple 
techniques are those consisting of a combination of single 
activetechniques, i.e. driving the intervenee and preventing the 
intervenee from driving.
The chi square value (not significant at the .05 level of 
confidence) indicates that the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables may not be genuine as the data arrangement may 
be a ttr ibu tab le  to chance alone. This should not be used to invalidate 
the importance of showing that mixed intervention techniques are widely 
successful; logic alone tells us they should be. Rather, the inability to 
claim statistical significance at an acceptable level of confidence is a 
reflection of the fact that no significant differences appear between 
multiple technique categories.
In summary of findings presented thus fa r  it has been shown that 
although specific categories of intervenee and intervention setting do 
not have statistical bearing on intervention success, intervention success 
is nevertheless widely prevalent throughout most intervenee categories as 
well as settings. This in itself is an im portant finding. An assertion 
made by Rabow, et al. can be reiterated and simultaneously qualified: 
"College students do intervene in drunk  driv ing situations" (1986:224), 
and a vast m ajority of the intervention attempts are successful. It has 
also been found that when considering single techniques of 
interventions attempted, there is a strong statistical association between 
categories of specific techniques and success. This f ind ing  was
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supplemented by a chi square value that exceeded its required level for 
significance at the .01 confidence level. Interestingly, the strong 
association between intervention technique and in tervention success 
disappears when multiple techniques are considered. The reason for this, 
again, is that the proportion of successes do not d i f fe r  tremendously 
from one multiple technique to another.
Non-Interveners
While it was earlier stated that 83 percent of the total 195 
student respondents surveyed reported having attempted to intervene in 
a potential drinking-driving situation and that a m ajority of their latest 
attempts were made within six months prior to their participation in this 
research project, 45 percent (n=87) of the total 195 students admitted 
that there had been times when they could have attempted to intervene 
but for one reason or another did not do so. (Eight percent more 
stated they did not know if  they had ever been in such a situation.) If 
intervention is to be explored, it is only f itting  that  we examine those 
who decide against attempting to intervene. This issue will now be 
addressed as potential intervenees not intervened upon, settings of 
declined intervention attempts, and rationale behind unattem pted 
interventions are considered.
Of the non-intervener subsample, over ha lf  of the 87 respondents 
(57 percent) identified the person on whom they could have intervened 
as a friend  (Table 13). While ha lf  of this percentage specified the 
fr iend  as a member of the opposite sex, the other ha lf  indicated that 
she/he was of the same sex. This proportion d iffe rs  somewhat from
Table 13
NO N-INTERVENEE FREQUENCIES
(in percent)
Non-Intervenees 
Friend of Opposite Sex
Friend of Same Sex
Stranger
Co-worker
Relative
Frequency
29
(25)
29
(25)
28
(24)
8
(7)
7
(6)
ToT
(87)*
* The figure  87 is equal to 45 percent of all respondents surveyed and 
constitutes the total number of respondents within the student 
non-intervener subsample.
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that presented in Table 6. There, nearly one and one-half friends of 
the same sex were intervened upon for every friend  of the opposite 
sex; here, the proportional breakdown is one for one or exactly equal.
While intervention was not attempted on a friend  in one-half of 
the reported cases, another 28 percent of those who stated they could 
have intervened but did not identified the potential intervenee as a 
stranger. Eight percent more reported a co-worker as the object of 
potential intervention that was left unattempted, and the remaining 
seven percent stated that the person was a relative. This is interesting 
as it seems to connote that the intervenee assumes no great risk when 
attempting to deter a relative from driving a f te r  drinking; hence, 
relatives are objects of intervention more often than potential objects of 
interventions unattempted.
Thirty-six percent of the non-intervener subsample reported to 
have been a t a party  when they last could have intervened but did not 
while 34 percent said they were at a ba r/n igh t club (Table 14).
Another 10 percent claimed to have been in their own homes as 
compared with 7 percent who reported to have been at the home of a 
friend. Six percent said they were at work, and only 3 percent 
indicated they were a t a restaurant the last time they could have made 
an intervention attempt. The 3 percent situated w ithin the "other" 
category include 1 respondent who reported having not intervened at a 
church function and 2 respondents who said they had an opportunity to 
intervene in a parking lot but did not make the effort.
All respondents indicating that they could have intervened a t one 
time but did not were asked to identify  with a reason best describing
Table 14
SETTINGS OF UNATTEM PTED INTERVENTION
(in percent)
Settings
Party
Bar/N ight Club 
Own Home 
F riend’s Home 
Work
Restaurant
Other
Frequency
36
(31)
34
(30)
10
(9)
7
(6)
6
(5)
3
(3)
3
(3)
~99
(87)*
* The figure  87 represents the number of respondents comprising 
subsample (non-interveners) of all respondents.
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Table 15
RATIONALE BEHIND UNATTEM PTED
(in percent)
Single Rationale
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also 
Other Person Could Drive All Right 
Did Not Want to Create Friction 
Useless to Try 
Not Respondent’s Concern 
Someone Else Could Handle Situation 
Did Not Know Other Person Well Enough 
Single Rationale Total 
Multiple Rationale
Did Not Know Other Person Well Enough/ 
Someone Else Could Handle Situation
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also/
Did Not Know Other Person Well Enough
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also/
Other Person Could Drive All Right
Useless to T ry /
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also/
Someone Else Could Handle Situation
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also/
Someone Else Could Handle Situation
Not Respondent’s Concern/
Did Not Know Other Person Well Enough
Respondent Had Been Drinking Also/
Useless to Try
Multiple Rationale Total
COMBINED TOTAL
INTERVENTION
Frequency 
18 (16)
11 ( 10)
7 (6)
6 (5)
6 (5)
5 (4)
1 ( 1)
54 (47)
15 (13)
7 (6)
7 (6)
6 (5)
5 (4)
3 (3)
3 (3)
46 (40)
100 (87)*
* The figure 87 represents a subsample of respondents.
their rationale for not having done so (Table 15). The modal single 
reason given for failing to intervene is that the respondent (i.e. 
potential intervener) had been drinking also; this was reported by 18 
percent. Another 11 percent indicated that they felt as if the potential 
intervenee was not all that drunk and was thus able to drive safely. 
Seven percent of the respondents within the non-intervention subsample 
did not want to a ttem pt intervention because they did not wish to 
create "friction" with the potential object of intervention. Six percent 
simply believed intervention was not their concern at the time, and the 
same percentage thought an intervention attempt would be a simply 
useless effort. Five percent believed someone else would handle the 
situation. It is interesting that only 1 percent of the non-interveners 
gave the fact that they did not know the potential intervenee well 
enough as a rationale for not intervening. Hence, even though 28 
percent identif ied  the potential intervenee as a stranger, only 1 percent 
stated the sole reason for not attempting intervention was that  she/he 
did not know the potential intervention object well enough.
It appears, then, tha t  the following factors underlie a respondent’s 
decision against attem pting intervention. First, the m ajority of 
unattempted interventions occurred in cases of potential 
drinking-driving involving a friend  of the intervenee, yet nearly half  as 
many involved a stranger. Thus, potential intervenees did not intervene 
in certain situations involving friends or strangers. Second, the settings 
most frequently  reported where intervention was not a ttempted include 
parties (36 percent) and bars or night clubs (34 percent). Hence, 70 
percent of all unattempted interventions occurred in one or the other of
these settings. Third, the most frequently  reported, single reason for 
declining intervention is that the respondent had been drinking  also, 
something that can easily occur at a party  or night club in the presence 
of both friends and strangers. The most frequently  reported, multiple 
reason, on the other hand, is that  the respondent did not know the 
object of potential intervention well enough and that someone else could 
handle the situation.
Inform al Intervenees
Forty-six percent (n=89) of the 195 respondents stated tha t  they 
themselves had at one time or another been objects of in tervention (i.e. 
intervenees). As presented in Table 16, only 7 percent of these 
respondents identif ied  the in tervener as a relative—parent, sibling, 
spouse or o ther—while 2 percent identif ied  this person as a co-worker. 
The remaining 91 percent stated that the intervenee was a f r iend  with 
same-sex friends being identif ied  by 54 percent of this subsample and 
opposite-sex friends by 37 percent.
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Table 16
INTERVENER FREQUENCIES
(in percent)
Intervener Frequency
Friend of Same Sex 54 (48)
Friend of Opposite Sex 37 (33)
Relative 1 (6)
Co-worker 2 (2 )
100 (89) *
* The figure, 89, represents a subsample of respondents reporting 
themselves as having been objects of intervention.
It is interesting that not one respondent reported being intervened 
upon by a stranger or co-worker considered also to be a friend, for 
again, 6 percent of the respondents reported this when they were 
recognized as informal interveners. Nevertheless, it appears that  friends 
are overwhelmingly initiators of in tervention with relatives being second. 
This finding, then, does not d if fe r  much from the one presented in Table 
6 .
Settings a t which respondents report being objects of intervention 
include a party  (43 percent), a ba r/n igh t club (35 percent), the home of 
a f r iend  (13 percent), the home of the respondent (6 percent), and a 
restaurant (3 percent). These figures are shown in Table 17.
The data of Table 17 also show a strong resemblance to data 
presented earlier in this discussion (Table 7). Thus, settings in which 
respondents report themselves as objects of intervention are
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Table 17 
SETTINGS OF INTERVENTION 
(in percent)
Settings Frequency
Party 43 (38)
Bar/N ight Club 35 (31)
Friend’s Home 13 (12)
Own Home 6 (5)
R estaurant 3 (3)
100 (89)*
* The figure, 89, represents a subsample of respondents reporting 
themselves as having been objects of intervention.
proportionately similar to settings in which they reported being 
intervenees. This f ind ing  should offe r  credence to the data, at least 
insofar as reliability  is concerned. Not one respondent reported being 
intervened upon a t work or at any other location.
According to reported experiences of respondent intervenees, the 
most frequently  reported single technique of in tervention received is 
being driven by the intervener; this was reported by one-quarter of the 
respondent-as-intervenee subsample (Table 18). Other common single 
techniques received include being verbally told not to drive drunk (13 
percent) and being told to stay at a place to which the respondent did 
not have to drive (10 percent). Nine percent of the respondents 
indicated that the intervener had arranged for someone else to drive 
he r/h im  home, and for 6 percent, the intervener offered  to follow the
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Table 18
TECHNIQUES OF INTERVENTION RESPONDENTS RECEIVED
(in percent)
Single Technique Frequency
Drive by Intervener 25 (22)
Verbally Tell 13 (12)
Have Stay 10 (9)
Have Someone Drive 9 (8)
O ffer  to Follow 6 (5)
Threaten to Prevent 4 (4)
Actually Prevent 3 (3)
Single Totals 70 (63)
Multiole Techniaues
Verbally Tell/
Drive by Intervener 12 (11)
Verbally Tell/  
Actually Prevent/ 
Drive by Intervener 8 (7)
Verbally Tell/  Actually Prevent 5 (4)
Threaten to Prevent/  
Have Someone Drive 3 (3)
Actually Prevent/  
Have Stay 1 (1)
Multiple Totals 29 (26)
COMBINED TOTAL 99 (89)*
* The figure  89 represents a subsampling of respondent intervenees.
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respondent home to make sure the drive was uneventful, an impartial 
"intervention attempt" at best. Only 4 percent indicated that the 
intervener threatened to prevent them from driving, and for 3 percent, 
prevention was actual. Multiple techniques were reported by the 
remaining 29 percent of the respondents within the subsample. The most 
frequently  reported multiple technique of intervention is being told not 
to drive then being driven by the intervenee (12 percent), being told not 
to drive, prevented from driving then driven home (8 percent), being 
told not to drive and prevented from driving (5 percent), being 
prevented by threat from driving then driven home by someone other 
than the in tervener (3 percent), and being prevented from driv ing then 
given a place to stay for the night (1 percent).
Of the 89 respondents who reported being objects of intervention,
78 percent of them reported successful intervention attempts in that 
they were informally deterred from drinking-driving. Table 19 contains 
crosstabulation of Table 12-categories of persons identif ied  as being 
interveners—by success. Again, success refers to whether or not the 
attempted intervention worked and thereby informally deterred 
driv ingafter  drinking.
Success rates d i f fe r  here in Table 19 somewhat from the rates 
reported in Table 9 (i.e. categories of intervenees by success). Recall 
that in that  table success rates for all in tervention attempts ranged from 
80 to 100 percent with the exception of one anomalous category, "other." 
Here in Table 19, however, the best success rate  is found within  the 
friend-of-same-sex category (88 percent success) while friends of 
opposite sex and relatives show a success rate of 67 percent and
Table 19
CATEGORY OF INTERVENER BY SUCCESS
(in percent)
Successful Unsuccessful
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
Intervener 
Friend of
Same Sex 88 13 101
(42) (6) (48)
Friend of
Opposite Sex 67 33 100
(22) (11) (33)
Relative 67 33 100
(4) (2) (6)
Co-worker 50 50 100
(1) (1) (2)
"78" ~22 100
(69) (20) (89)
Chi Square = 6.12 with 3 d.f. 
N.S.
Cramer’s V = 0.26
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coworkers, a rate of 50 percent. Nevertheless, data of Table 19 show 
that the overall majority of intervention attempts are successful, a 
f inding shared by the interpretation of Table 9.
The Cramer’s V value for Table 19 indicates there is a moderately 
weak association between the intervener category and intervention 
success. This value is indicative of the great percentage of successes 
reported in cases where friends of the same sex intervened vis-a-vis the 
lower success rates in all other categories. The chi square value 
indicates that the arrangement of data  here could be the result of 
chance alone as 6.12 is less than the 7.82 value required at the .05 
confidence level.
Table 20 contains a crosstabulation of category of intervention 
setting by success. Like the data shown in Table 10, the m ajority of 
reported interventions occurred at a party  (43 percent). Unlike Table 10 
where attempted interventions at parties were successful 77 percent of 
the time, however, parties are reported as being successful intervention 
sites 84 percent of the time in Table 19. Although this d ifference  is 
not large, it does reflect a 7 percent improvement. Other reported 
settings of intervention include attempts made at a ba r/n igh t club (35 
percent), e fforts  attempted at the home of a friend  (13 percent), efforts  
made at one’s own home (6 percent), and attempts made at a restaurant 
(3 percent). Work was not a reported setting of intervention on 
respondents.
The Cramer’s V value calculated for Table 20 suggests that a weak 
statistical association exists between intervention sites and intervention 
success. Again, however, I must qua lify  this finding: informal
Table 20
CATEGORY OF INTERVENTION SETTING BY SUCCESS
(in percent)
Setting
Party
Bar/N ight Club 
F riend’s Home 
Own Home 
Restaurant
Successful Unsuccessful
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
84 16 100
(32) (6) (38)
68 32 100
(21) (10) (31)
83 17 100
(10) (2) (12)
60 40 100
(3) (2) (5)
33 67 100
(1) (2) (3)
75 ~25 Too
(67) (22) (89)
Chi Square = 6.03 with 4 d.f. 
N.S.
Cramer’s V = 0.26
intervention does work through the majority of attempts made, and it 
works regardless of the settings in which it is attempted. In other 
words, Cramer’s V finds little discrepancy between settings in terms of 
intervention success or failure. Most settings are reported as hosting 
successful interventions most of the time with the one exception of 
"restaurant" which has a greater failure than success rate.
Chi square indicates that the data arrangement in Table 20 could 
be a ttributable to chance alone as the value is less than the 9.49 value 
required at the .05 level of confidence. At the risk of introducing beta 
(or type II) error, we must fail to reject the hypothesis asserting that 
differences in successes are not attributable to d ifferences in setting. 
Again, however, this must be underscored or qualif ied  by the finding 
that most intervention attempts made succeed without reference to the 
setting in which they occurred.
Table 21 contains data displaying the relationship between 
intervention technique and success. It appears as though there is a 
moderately strong statistical relationship here between category of 
intervention technique and intervention success. This statement is 
expressed through Cramer’s V. Moreover, the chi square value far  
exceeds the 24.73 value required for statistical significance at the .01 
confidence level. The null hypothesis stating that  no relationship exists 
between intervention technique and success can therefore  be rejected.
It appears that the most direct or assertive interventions are also the 
most successful while more passive techniques result in more failures. 
Specific techniques promoting successes include being driven by the 
intervener or another person, being "put up" for the night, being told
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Table 21
CATEGORY OF INTERVENTION TECHNIQUE BY INTERVENTION SUCCESS
(in percent)
Successful Unsuccessful
Intervention Intervention TOTAL
Single Techniaues 
Drive by Intervener 100 (22) 0 (0) 100 (22)
Verbally Tell 33 (4) 67 (8) 100 (12)
Have Stay 100 (9) 0 (0) 100 (9)
Have Someone Drive 75 (6) 25 (2) 100 (8)
O ffer  to Follow 20 (1) 80 (4) 100 (5)
Threaten to Prevent 50 (2) 50 (2) 100 (4)
Actually Prevent 67 (2) 33 (1) 100 (3)
Single Technique 
Totals 73 (46) 27 (17) 100 (63)
Multinle Techniaues
Verbally Tell/
Drive by Intervener 100 (11) 0 (0) 100 (11)
Verbally Tell/ 
Actually Prevent/ 
Drive by Intervener 86 (6) 14 (1) 100 (7)
Verbally Tell/ 
Actually Prevent 75 (3) 25 (1) 100 (4)
Threaten to Prevent/ 
Have Someone Drive 33 (1) 67 (2) 100 (3)
Actually Prevent/ 
Have Stay 100 (1) 0 (0) 100 (1)
Multiple Technique 
Totals 85 (22) 15 (4) 100 (26)
COMBINED TOTAL 76 (68) 24 (21) 100 (89)
Chi Square 
P < .01 
Cramer’s V
= 40.23 with 11 
= 0.67
d.f.
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not to drive and then driven, being told not to drive and prevented 
from driving then driven, being told not to drive then prevented, and 
being prevented from driving then "put up" for the night. To the 
contrary, reported techniques often resulting in failure include simply 
being told not to drive, getting an  o ffe r  of being followed home, being 
"prevented" from driving by threat, and being threatened then offered  a 
ride. Again, all this suggests that technique is the strongest correlate 
of success; that is, that it is stronger than either object of intervention 
or intervention setting.
Data analysis thus fa r  has consisted of examining and addressing 
the three dimensions of intervention (actually two of the dimensions 
concern intervention while the third centers on non-intervention) 
introduced in Chapter Two. It has been shown, first of all, that 
intervention is something which occurs within the selected sample, and 
that intervention results in a successful end in most of the cases in 
which it is attempted. It has also been discovered that 83 percent of 
the sample elements surveyed have at one time or another intervened in 
a potential drinking-driving situation, that 45 percent report to have 
knowingly declined to intervene in a situation where intervention might 
have been helpful in deterring drinking-driving, and that 46 percent of 
the respondents identified themselves as objects of intervention on at 
least one account. Furthermore, it has also been shown that  "a friend" 
constitutes the modal category of persons who receive and deliver 
interventive action. It has been shown too that driving the intervenee 
is not only the most commonly employed single technique of intervention 
reported by the study sample, but one of the most successful as well (as
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are other "active" techniques). The most common setting of intervention 
is at a party  (closely followed by a bar or night club), a finding 
consistent through both dimensions of intervention. Finally, it has been 
shown that although strong statistical relationships between intervention 
success (the dependent variable) and hypothesized correlates (independent 
variables) have been absent, the most important findings are that 
intervention overwhelmingly succeeds without regard to the actors 
involved or the settings in which the intervention is attempted. (Only 
technique of intervention appears to have a strong association with 
success, but this association is fa r  from being a perfect one.)
The Social Psychology of Intervention:
Understanding the Phenomenon Through 
Demographic Variables and 
Self Concept
At this point in the presentation, two additional issues must be 
discussed. First, we must examine distinctions between the intervener 
and non-intervener, that is, distinctions in reference to selected 
demographic variables (sex, race, class standing, and religious 
preference). Second, we must discern whether or not a statistical 
association exists between a person’s self concept and intervention 
attempt and and subsequent success.
Demographic Factors
You will recall from data presented in Table 6 that  the vast 
majority of interveners (almost three-quarters) indicated that they were 
the intervenee’s friend  and that while slightly under ha lf  of them (42 
percent) reported to be a friend of the opposite sex, the majority
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indicated the converse. This finding was fu rther  advanced through data 
displayed in Table 13, and again, this underscores the notion that 
friends—as opposed to family members, co-workers, or strangers—are 
more apt to attempt interventions. Thus, we know tha t  most interveners 
are friends to the intervenee (at least this is what has been shown 
here). What are other characteristics of the interveners surveyed in this 
study? Are they predominately male, proportionately racial minority 
members, upperclassmen, or what?
Table 22 contains data  showing the crosstabulation between the 
independent variable—sex of potential in tervener—and dependent 
variable—intervention attempt.
Table 22
SEX BY ATTEMPTED INTERVENTION 
(in percent)
Intervention Intervention
Attempted Unattempted TOTAL
Sex
Male 91 (71) 9 (7) 100 (78)
Female 86 (93) 14 (15) 100 (108)
89 (164) 12 (22) 101 (186)*
Chi Square = 1.05 with 1 d.f.
Phi = 0.08
* Nine cases are missing.
By the appearance of the table alone it seems as though there is 
little association between sex and intervention attempt. Although more 
males reported having attempted interventions than females, the 
difference  is small. This analysis is supplemented by the phi coefficient 
which shows how weak the relationship actually is. Moreover, based on
the calculated chi square value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, it will be assumed that sex has extremely little i f  any bearing 
on intervention attempt. Again, it remains unknown as to how reliable 
this (as well as other aforementioned findings) are in reference to any 
other population of elements.
Race is another possible factor of association with attempted 
intervention. Data illustrating the race by intervention attem pt 
crosstabulation are located in Table 23. (It is unknown what the "other" 
category contains.)
Table 23
RACE BY INTERVENTION ATTEMPT 
(in percent)
Intervention Intervention
Attempted Unattem pted TOTAL
Race
White 89 (135) 11 (17) 100 (152)
Black 81 (13) 19 (3) 100 (16)
Hispanic 89 (8) 11 (1) 100 (9)
Oriental 86 (6) 14 (1) 100 (7)
American
Indian 100 (1) 0 (0) 100 (1)
Other 50 (1) 50 (1) 100 (2)
88 (164) 12 (23) 100 (187)"
Chi Square = 3.51 with 5 d.f.
Cramer’s V = 0.14
* Eight cases are missing.
Although whites are by fa r  the most represented racial group, 
percentage differences between various groups appear generally small. 
Cram er’s V indicates this lack of discrepancy between categories, and
the chi square value dictates that we fail to reject any hypothesis 
suggesting no statistical difference between racial categories and 
intervention attempts. Race, then, as with sex, is not a viable 
characteristic of interveners in comparison withnon-interveners.
Table 24 contains a crosstabulation of religious preference by 
attempted intervention. Independent variable categories include 
Protestant, Catholic Jewish, L.D.S., and other. The "other" category 
includes agnostics and atheists as well as other religious preferences not 
defined by the firs t  four categories.
Again, consistent with the previously discussed demographic 
variables, there does not exist a very strong statistical association 
between religious preference and intervention attempt; that is, 
in tervention attempts are not seen as being a correlate of one’s religious 
preference (Cramer’s V = 0.18). This is also supported by the chi square 
value which reflects no great distinction between categories of religious 
preference in reference to the dependent variable. As with the previous 
two variables examined (Tables 22 and 23), lack of statistical 
significance cannot obfuscate the im portant underlying fact: informal 
drinking-driving interventions occur in great numbers, but occurrence is 
not suffic ien tly  explained by the sexes, races, or religious preferences of 
those in itia ting it.
College-class standing (i.e. class standing) is crosstabulated with 
intervention attempt in Table 25.
Table 24
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE BY INTERVENTION ATTEMPT
(in percent)
Religious
Preference
Intervention
Attemnted
Intervention
Unatteirmted TOTAL
Protestant 88 (30) 12 (4) 100 (34)
Catholic 91 (42) 9 (4) 100 (46)
Jewish 80 (4) 20 (1) 100 (5)
L.D.S. 70 (7) 30 (3) 100 (10)
Other 90 (26) 10 (3) 100 (29)
88 (109) 12 (15) 100 (124)*
* There are 65 missing cases.
Chi Square = 3.90 with 4 d.f. 
Cramer’s V = 0.18
Table 25
COLLEGE CLASS STANDING BY INTERVENTION ATTEMPT
(in percent)
College
Class
Standing
Intervention
Attemoted
Intervention
Unattem oted TOTAL
Freshman 82 (60) 18 (13) 100 (73)
Sophomore 91 (60) 9 (6) 100 (66)
Junior 91 (29) 9 (3) 100 (32)
Senior 94 (15) 6 (1) 100 (16)
88 (164) 12 (23) 100 (187)*
*Two cases are missing.
Chi Square = 3.48 with 3 d.f. 
Cramer’s V = 0.14
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Data here display little difference between class standing and 
attempting intervention. Although upperclassmen are somewhat more 
proportionately represented under the "intervention attempted" category 
than lowerclassmen, this difference is ra ther  minute. The Cramer’s V 
value substantiates this claim. Chi square shows that once again we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level of confidence due to 
the fact that the 3.48 value does not exceed the 7.82 requirement.
Thus, although college class-standing has no direct bearing 
onintervention attempt, it has been shown that  intervention attempts are 
frequent regardless of one’s class standing; this cannot be overlooked.
Self Concept
In Chapter Two I mentioned that all respondents were asked to 
indicate how they felt about themselves so that a quantita tive  
self-concept measurement could be obtained (see the series of items 
labeled number seven in the questionnaire, Appendix A.). The responses 
provided on these items were summed across each case of the data set, 
thus providing a single self concept score for each respondent. While 
low scores reflect positive self-concepts, high scores signify negative 
ones. To facili ta te  statistical analysis, scores were divided into 
approximate quartile  categories. The lowest possible score is 14 and the 
highest is 70. Respondent scores, generally skewed to the lower end of 
the distribution, range from 14 to 50; the median self-concept score is 
31.
Table 26 portrays the crosstabulation of quartiled self-concept
73
scores by drinking-driving intervention attempt. As with the 
crosstabulation tables of demographic variables by intervention attempt, 
the data arrangement here indicates very little in the way of statistical 
association. The Cramer’s V value (0.09) and chi square indicate that 
the relationship is not statistically significant at .05 as the value 
required to reject the null hypothesis is equal to 7.82 (with 3 degrees of 
freedom). Thus, the operationalization of self concept here is not 
strongly associated with intervention attempt. Such a statemtent, 
however, must once again be qualified: Rather than interpreting the 
data in such a way as to draw the conclusion tha t  self-concept has very 
little to do with intervention attempts, it must be observed that 
intervention attempts occur regardless of self concept category. Thus 
persons with high reported self-concept scores are no more or less likely
Table 26
QUARTILED SELF-CONCEPT SCORES BY INTERVENTION ATTEMPT
(in percent)
Intervention Intervention
Attempted Unattem oted TOTAL
Self-Concept
Score
14 to 26 84 (37) 16 (7) 100 (44)
27 to 31 90 (46) 10 (5) 100 (51)
32 to 35 84 (47) 16 (9) 100 (56)
36 to 50 81 (34) 19 (8) 100 (42)
83 (164) 17 (29) 100 (193)
Chi Square = 1.67 with 3 d.f.
Cramer’s V = 0.09
74
to intervene in potential drinking-driv ing situations than are persons 
with low scores.
Summary of Data 
Analysis
This chapter has shown not only that college students have the 
capacity to intervene in potential drinking-driving situations but that 
their  interventions are surprisingly successful the m ajority of the times 
tried. We have seen that all intervener-intervenee relationships, all 
settings of intervention, and "active" intervention techniques have a 
tendency to contribute to the success of an intervention attem pt even 
though most of these statistical associations are not significant. It must 
be emphasized, however, that statistical significance is not substantive 
significance and that, as with the findings presented here, substantive 
significance is more im portant in terms of interpreting results. Again 
and again it has been shown that  intervention attempts can be successful 
regardless of persons involved or situational settings and that 
consistently the most successful techniques of informal in tervention are 
those which are most intrusive.
As for demographic and social-psychological factors, neither sex, 
race, religious preference, collegeclass-standing, nor self-concept 
appears to influence intervention attempts. These findings are promising 
as they indicate that all cross-sections of persons are able to attempt 
informal interventions.
The only evidence presented to show why some people do not 
intervene a t certain times has been that the potential in tervener had
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been drinking. Surprisingly, few respondents indicated that they did not 
intervene only because the potential object of intervention was a 
stranger to them.
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Chapter Four 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Drinking-driving is a contemporary social problem, but one which 
need not always persist. Although no strong correlates were found in 
terms of explaining why some persons take it upon themselves to 
intervene in potential drinking-driving situations and others do not, this 
study did find that informal drinking-driving intervention efforts  are not 
uncommon and that they succeed in deterring d runken  driving much more 
often than they fail. This is important as it shows that  some 
persons—(namely those who have intervened)—are doing something about 
the problem. Granted, their justifications may not be this—perhaps they 
feel they are watching out for the well being of a friend , for 
exam ple-bu t in effect, they are doing something about the problem.
This study actually began with the assumption tha t  drinking  and 
driving was being over-played by policy makers across the United 
States. The initial goal was to do a study on inform al intervention and 
tie the results into a theory of hegemonic control. The underlying 
theme would have been that people attempt informal interventions as a 
consequence of media blitzes disseminating messages such as "Friends 
don’t let friends drive drunk" to the public consciousness. In doing this, 
so the argument would have extended, people would be practicing 
behaviors "suggested" to them by governing societal forces. Policy 
makers, then, have reason to over-emphasize the problem.
As I was trying to shape this study I came across some 
inform ation that made me th ink twice about the p lanned approach. I
read through some articles describing how MADD and other 
drinking-driv ing organizations were trying to effect change in 
drunken-driv ing legislation, and it occurred to me that the problem of 
driv ing a f te r  drinking is not an objective one (i.e. something existing 
out there waiting to be recognized, measured, and analyzed), it is a 
subjective problem in that it exists in the minds of those who define 
and recognize it as a problem. Thus, statistics telling how many lives 
are lost annually to drinking drivers, how much money drinking drivers 
cost tax and insurance payers, how many persons in a given area drive 
drunk  on any given day, etc. are useful in grasping the breadth of the 
problem, but they do not in themselves constitute the problem. Again, 
d rinking and driving is a problem because people view it as one; it has 
been subjectively defined as something to be remedied.
Because of this shift  from objectivity to subjectivity the focus or 
scope of the study was changed. Rather than tackling the 
drinking-driv ing issue on a macro level, it became necessary to analyze 
micro dynamics and their implications. Hence, the theme of informal 
in tervention emerged, for through this theme it became necessary to 
measure subjective orientations (such as whether or not one viewed 
drinking-driv ing as constituting a problem, as successfully being reduced 
through legislation and law enforcement, as demanding remedial 
attention, and so on) and more importantly  their manifestations, 
specifically the behavior of informal intervention.
Informal intervention has been addressed here in three dimensions: 
dimension one focused on the respondent as intervener; dimension two, 
the respondent as non-intervener; and dimension three, the respondent
as intervenee. Consistent through both dimensions one and three are 
the findings that (1) students attempt to prevent the combination of 
drinking-driving in large proportions; (2) interveners tend to be friends 
of the intervenees, but interventions made on strangers also occur; (3) 
attempts at intervention most frequently  occur at parties or public 
drinking establishments (i.e. events and places at which drinking is 
expected and accepted); and (4) the great majority of attempts, 
regardless of who intervenes on whom or where the intervention occurs, 
are successful in that the undesireable behavior is deterred, and this is 
especially true when active or assertive techniques are employed. These 
are important findings in that they define the patterns of intervention. 
Each point is crucial to an understanding of the phenomenon.
On the other hand, patterns of non-intervention have also been 
explored. It appears that non-intervention is characterized by the 
following points: (1) Non-intervention occurs most frequently  among 
friends, but strangers are often potential objects as well; (2) 
non-intervention takes place where the majority of interventions occur 
(i.e.parties and bars/n ight clubs); and (3) the most common rationale for 
declining intervention is that the potential intervener had been drinking 
or that she/he did not know the potential object well enough.
Demographic variables were of no assistance in attempting to 
d ifferen tia te  between non-interveners and interveners. Sex, race, 
religious preference, and college class-standing were all examined, but in 
each case the decision was to fail to reject the hypothesis of no 
difference between their respective categories. This study was not 
effective in granting a profile of interveners as distinguished from
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non-interveners. Again, however, this must be qualified with the 
underscoring that intervention attempts were made in large proportions 
through each of the independent variable categories.
Finally, self-concept was of no assistance in d iffe ren tia ting  
interveners from non-interveners either. It has been shown that 
regardless of respondent-reported self-concepts, intervention is 
attempted. This is true of both those with low and high self-concept 
scores.
Future  research in the area of informal drinking-driving 
interventions should emphasize intervener motivation. Why do people 
intervene in situations involving potential drinking-driving? We might 
assume that  interveners are driven to attempt interventions due to the 
fact that they know the objectively serious consequences of driv ing afte r  
drinking, but this can mean one of two things. On the one hand, 
interveners may be acting intentionally  on the behalf of the greater 
society, protecting its members from an undesired risk (as might be the 
case when a stranger is targeted as the object of intervention), but on 
the other, interveners may be acting on the behalf of the intervenee by 
attempting to protect that person from being killed, injured, or arrested. 
Hence, a dual dimension of intervention motivation emerges. This would 
be important to document in greater detail. Moreover, it is only 
through knowledge of motivation that policy-makers could attempt to 
influence persons to intervene. I f  stimuli motivating persons to attempt 
in tervention were uncovered, they could be used to benefit the members 
of society. A collective discouragement of drinking-driving could 
produce some major changes.
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Appendix A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction
This study is being conducted for thesis purposes. The 
questionnaire is designed to explore your views on the 
occurrence of drunken driving in the Las Vegas area. 
Your voluntary participation in completing this 
questionnaire is greatly appreciated. I assure you that 
your answers will be kept strictly confidential.
1. Drunken driving is one of several social problems 
confronting our local area. Using a scale from 1 to 10, 
with 1 meaning "very serious" and 10 meaning "not at all 
serious, please rank the social problems listed below in 
terms of how serious a th rea t you think they are to 
residents of the Las Vegas area.
Circle the number corresponding to your response for 
each case.
Very Not
Serious Serious
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
A) Drug Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B) Prostitution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C) Air Pollution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
D) Drunk Driving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
E) AIDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F) Uninsured 
Motorist
Offenses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
G) Poverty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
H) Child Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I) Racism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
J) Sexism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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2. Below are printed some general statements about drunk 
driving. For each statement, please indicate whether you
(1) STRONGLY AGREE, (2) AGREE, (3) are UNDECIDED, 
(4) DISAGREE, or (5) STRONGLY DISAGREE. Circle the 
number corresponding to your response.
SA A U D SD
A) Drunk drivers pose a serious threat to
the safety of Las Vegas area residents. 1 2 3 4 5
B) The rate of drunk driving in our local
area is high. 1 2 3 4 5
C) Law enforcement authorities have over­
reacted to the drunk  driving issue. 1 2 3 4 5
D) Most persons have at one time or another
driven under the influence of alcohol. 1 2 3 4 5
E) The majority of drinking and driving 
offenses committed in the Las Vegas
area are committed by tourists. 1 2 3 4 5
F) Local law enforcement officers do a 
good job of identify ing most of the
drunken  drivers in our area. 1 2 3 4 5
G) While driv ing under the influence of 
alcohol, problem drinkers pose a greater 
threat to the safety of others than does
the occasional drinker. 1 2 3 4 5
H) Persons who have been drinking are more 
cautious and attentive in their driving
than are more sober drivers. 1 2 3 4 5
I) Although driving under the influence of
alcohol is illegal, it  is socially
acceptable by today’s standards. 1 2 3 4 5
J) Penalties for driving under the influence 
of alcohol are more severe than public 
concern would dictate. 1 2 3 4 5
K) The threa t of arrest and prosecution for 
a d runken  driving offense keeps many 
persons from driving after  drinking. 1 2 3 4 5
L) A person who insists on driving a f te r  
she/he has been drinking will eventually 
be arrested for drunken driving. 1 2 3 4 5
M) While driving under the influence of 
alcohol, alcoholics pose a greater threat 
to others than do occasional drinkers. 1 2 3 4 5
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3. Following are some questions about the severity of 
certain penalties for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI) offenses. The Nevada State Legislature 
has divided DUI-offense category into three 
sub-headings: (1) First and Second Time Offenses,
(2) Repeat O ffenses-T hree  Times or More, and
(3) Offenses Resulting in Death or Serious Bodily Harm 
of Another Person.
3a. Below is a list of penalties which can be given to
FIRST- and SECOND-TIME OFFENDERS. Using a scale 
from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning "too severe" and 5 meaning 
"not severe enough--a rating of 3 means "just 
right"—please indicate how severe you feel each penalty is 
by circling the number appropriate  to your response.
Too Just Not 
Severe Right Enough
A) A sentence of 2 days in jail 1 2 3 4 5
B) A sentence of 6 months in jail 1 2 3 4 5
C) A fine of $1,000 1 2 3 4 5
D) The performance of 48 hours
community service work 1 2 3 4 5
E) A 90 day driver license suspension 1 2 3 4 5
F) Enrollment in an educational course
on the dangers of alcohol abuse 1 2 3 4 5
G) Placement into an alcoholism
rehabilita tion center 1 2 3 4 5
3b. Using the same 1 to 5 scale (again, 1 means "too 
severe," 5, "not severe enough," and 3, "just right") 
please indicate how severe you feel each of the 
following penalties is for the REPEAT DUI OFFENDER.
A) A sentence of 3 years in prison
B) A sentence of 6 years in prison
C) A fine of $5,000
D) Enrollment in an educational 
course on alcohol abuse
E) Placement into an alcoholism 
rehabilitation facility
Too
Severe
1
1
1
Just 
Right 
2 3
2
2
Not
Enough 
4 5
4
4
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3c. Finally, using the same 1 to 5 scale, please indicate 
how severe you feel each of the following penalties is 
for the DUI offense which results in the DEATH OR 
SERIOUS BODILY HARM of another person.
Too Just Not
Severe Right Enough
A) A sentence of 6 years in prison 1 2 3 4 5
B) A sentence of 10 years in prison 1 2 3 4 5
C) A sentence of 20 years in prison 1 2 3 4 5
D) A fine of $5,000 1 2 3 4 5
E) Enrollment in an educational
course on the dangers of alcohol 1 2 3 4 5
F) Placement into an alcoholism
rehabilitation facili ty  1 2 3 4 5
4. At times there may be occasion for a person to
intervene in a possible drunken-driv ing situation. Have 
you ever tried to stop someone from  driving because you 
felt that person was too drunk  to drive safely?
1 Yes (GO TO Q4a.)
2 No (GO TO Q5.)
8 Don’t Know (Q5.)
4a. Who was the last person you tried to stop from  driving 
a f te r  drinking? Was it. . .
1 A parent
2 A brother/s ister
3 Your spouse
4 Some other relative
5 A friend  of the opposite sex
6 A friend  of the same sex
7 A co-worker
8 Someone you d idn’t know
9 OTHER (please specify)
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4b. Where were you the last time you tried to stop someone 
from driving a f te r  that person had been drinking? Were 
you at. . .
1 A friend’s home
2 A party
3 A bar/n igh t club
4 A restaurant
5 Work
6 Your own home
7 OTHER (please specify)
4c. How did you handle the situation last time you tried 
to stop someone from driving a f te r  drinking? Did you 
(circle all response numbers that  apply)
01 Verbally tell the other person
not to drive
02 O ffer  to follow the other person
03 Have someone drive the person
04 Drive the other person yourself
05 Threaten to somehow prevent the
other person from  driving (e.g. 
threaten to take car keys).
06 Actually prevent the person from
driving (e.g. take keys).
07 Have the other person stay some­
where she/he did not have to 
drive to (e.g. at your home)
08 OTHER (please specify)
4d. Was this last e ffo r t  at stopping another person from 
driving successful, d id  it keep he r/h im  from  driving?
1 Yes 2 No 8 D on’t Know
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5. Have there ever been times when you COULD HAVE tried 
to stop someone from driving (because you felt that 
person was too drunk to drive) but did not attempt it?
1 Yes 2 No 8 Don’t Know
(GO TO Q5a.) (GO TO Q6.) (GO TO Q6.)
5a. Who was the last person you could have tried to stop 
from driving after  drinking but d idn’t? Was it. . .
1 A parent
2 A brother or sister
3 Your spouse
4 Some other relative
5 A friend  of the opposite sex
6 A friend  of the same sex
7 A co-worker
8 Someone you d idn ’t know
9 OTHER (please specify)
5b. Where were you the last time you could have but d idn’t 
try  to stop someone from driving a f te r  drinking? Were 
you at. . .
1 A fr ien d ’s home
2 A party
3 A bar/n igh t  club
4 A restaurant
5 Work
6 Your own home
7 OTHER (please specify)
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5c. Still thinking about the last time you could have tried 
to stop someone from driving a f te r  that person had been 
drinking, why d idn ’t you try? Was it because (circle 
numbers that apply to your response).
01 You thought it would be useless
to try, the other person was set 
on driving
02 You felt it was not your concern
03 You d idn ’t know the other person 
well enough.
04 You thought the other person could 
drive all right
05 You d idn’t want to create any 
"friction" in your relationship 
with the other person
06 You had been drinking also
07 You thought someone else would 
handle the situation
08 OTHER (please specify)
6. Have there ever been times when someone tried to stop 
you from driving because she/he felt that  you d rank  too 
much to drive safely?
1 Yes 2 No 3 Don’t Know
(GO TO Q6a.) (GO TO Q7.) (GO TO Q7.)
6a. Who was the last person that  tried to stop you from  
driving a f te r  you had been drinking? Was it. . .
1 A parent
2 A brother or sister
3 Your spouse
4 Some other relative
5 A friend  of the opposite sex
6 A friend  of the same sex
7 A co-worker
8 Someone you d idn ’t know
9 OTHER (please specify)
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6b. Where were you the last time someone tried to stop you 
a fter  you had been drinking? Were you at. . .
1 A fr ien d ’s house
2 A party
3 A bar/n igh t  club
4 A restaurant
5 Work
6 Your own home
7 OTHER (please specify)
6c. Still thinking about the last time someone tried to
stop you from driv ing a f te r  you had been drinking, what 
did she/he do? Did she/he (circle all numbers that 
apply)
01 Verbally tell you not to drive
02 O ffe r  to follow you home
03 Have someone drive you
04 Drive you her-/him self
05 Threaten to somehow prevent
you from driving (e.g. threaten 
to take your keys)
06 Actually prevent you from
driving (e.g. take your keys)
07 Have you stay somewhere you did
not have to drive to (e.g. at 
their home)
08 OTHER (please specify)
6d. Was this other person’s e ffo r t  at stopping you from 
driving successful; that is, did it  keep you from 
driving?
1 Yes 2 N o 3 Don’t Know
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7. Please show how you ordinarily  think of yourself by
placing an X somewhere between the two opposite words. 
For example, suppose you have the pair of words:
STRONG WEAK:
Strong ( ) ( ) ( X )  ( ) (  ) Weak
Very Strong Average Weak Very 
Strong Weak
If  you think of yourself as average, mark an X on the 
space above "average." For each of these pairs of 
words, place an X on the point of the scale which best 
represents the way you think about yourself.
Powerful
Honest
Good
Confident
Kind
Strong
Attractive
Dependable
Tolerant
Wise
Do Most 
Things Well
Brave
Generous
Worthy
THE WAY I THINK OF MYSELF
Powerless 
Dishonest 
Bad
Lacks Confid. 
Cruel 
Weak
U nattractive 
Undependable 
Critical 
Foolish
Do Few Things 
Well
Cowardly 
Selfish 
Worthless
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8. Please indicate how long it has been since you have done 
the following things. Has it been (1) LESS THAN ONE 
MONTH, (2) ONE TO SIX MONTHS, (3) SIX MONTHS TO A 
YEAR (4) MORE THAN ONE YEAR, or (5) NEVER.
How long has it been since you have. . .
A) communicated the possible consequences
of drunken  driving to another person? 1 2 3 4 5
B) informed the police about a possible
drunk  driver you saw? 1 2 3 4 5
C) ridden with a driver who had been
drinking? 1 2  3 4 5
D) decided not to drive because you had
been drinking? 1 2 3 4 5
E) "elected" a designated driver before
going out to drink? 1 2 3 4 5
F) been a designated driver yourself? 1 2 3 4 5
G) attempted to stop someone from
driving a f te r  drinking? 1 2 3 4 5
H) had someone attempt to stop you 
from  driving afte r  you had been
drinking? 1 2  3 4 5
9. How often do you drink  alcoholic beverages?
1 Never
2 Once a month or less
3 Once every three weeks
4 Once every two weeks
5 Once a week
6 Twice a week
7 More than twice a week but
not every day
8 Daily
96
10. When you drink  alcoholic beverages, how much do you 
usually consume in a single sitting? (For this 
question assume that one d rink  is equal to 12 ounces 
of beer, 4 ounces of wine or cooler, and one ounce
of liquor.)
1 One or two drinks
2 Three to f ive drinks
3 Six to eight drinks
4 Nine to twelve drinks
5 More than twelve drinks
11. Considering the last three occasions on which you 
drank  alcoholic beverages, on any one of them did 
you consume enough alcohol to consider yourself 
intoxicated?
1 Yes (GO TO Q13.)
2 No (GO TO Q15.)
8 Don’t Know
12. If  you answered "YES" to the last question, on any one 
of those occasions that  you considered yourself to be 
intoxicated did you drive a f te r  drinking?
1 Yes (GO TO Q14.)
2 No (GO TO Q15.)
8 Don’t Know
13. Following is a list of places where people might drink 
and then drive. Thinking about the last few years, use 
this list to indicate where you were most likely to be 
coming from afte r  drinking. Use "1" fo r  the most 
likely place and "7" for the place least likely; use 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 for corresponding "in-between" places.
A) A fr iend ’s home
B) A party
C) A bar/lounge
D) A restaurant
E) Work
F) Your home
G) OTHER (specify)
The remaining questions are for statistical purposes.
14. What is your sex? 1 Male
2 Female
15. What is your age? ( ) Years
16. What is your marital status?
1 Single, never married
2 M arried
3 Separated
4 Divorced
5 Widowed
17. Which of the following best describes your racial 
grouping?
1 White
2 Black
3 Hispanic
4 Oriental
5 American Indian
6 Other
18. Which of the following categories best describes your 
MOTHER’S educational background?
1 Less than high-school graduate
2 High-school graduate
3 Some college
4 College graduate
5 Post-college graduate 
8 DON’T KNOW
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19. Which of the following categories best describes your 
FA THER’S educational background?
1 Less than high-school graduate
2 High-school graduate
3 Some college
4 College graduate
5 Post-college graduate 
8 DON’T KNOW
20. What is your college class-standing?
1 Freshman
2 Sophomore
3 Junior
4 Senior
5 OTHER (specify please)
21. Are you presently a ttending school. . .
1 Less than half  time
2 H alf  time
3 More than half, but not full
4 Full time
22. Are you presently. . .
1 Unemployed
2 Employed half  time or less
3 Employed more than ha lf  time but
not full time
4 Employed full time
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23. What is your religious preference? Is it. . .
1 Protestant
2 Catholic
3 Jewish
4 L.D.S
5 OTHER (specify please)
This concludes the questionnaire. T hank you very much for 
your cooperation and participation. Feel free to write any 
comments you may have about this study or drinking-driving in 
general in the space provided below. Again, thank  you.
